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A PUBLIC PENSIONS BAILOUT: ECONOMICS AND LAW
Terrance O’Reilly†
ABSTRACT
In several states, public pension plans are at risk of insolvency within a decade.
These risks are significant, and the solutions currently contemplated are likely to
fall short of what is necessary to contain the problem. If public pension plans do
become insolvent, it seems likely the federal government will bail them out. This
Article proposes that the federal government prepare for the prospect of federal fi-
nancial support of public pension plans by instituting an optional regulatory
regime for public pensions. If a state elects not to participate, its public pension
plans would be ineligible for federal financial support. In states that do elect to
participate, public plans would be eligible for federal financial support in the event
of severe financial distress. All public plans in these states would be subject to a
federal regulatory regime similar to ERISA, including minimum funding require-
ments. Congress could also authorize sponsors of regulated plans to revise existing
employees’ retirement benefits with respect to future services, an option that is avail-
able to private employers. This flexibility would allow for much more significant
pension reforms on the state and local level since in many states pension reforms
can only alter the benefits of new hires.
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INTRODUCTION
The monetary rewards from a career as a public school teacher,
police officer, or firefighter can be very respectable, but the finan-
cial upside is usually limited. The traditional compensation for
these positions includes the satisfactions of public service, a degree
of job security beyond what the private sector offers, and relatively
comfortable retirement benefits. In some jurisdictions, however, in-
adequate funding has placed the pension benefits of public
employees in real jeopardy. Since the time horizon for pension ob-
ligations is very long, unsound pension financing can persist for
decades before the scheme collapses. Now a significant number of
state and local government pension funds are approaching
insolvency.1
Often enough, public pension fund insolvencies are likely to be
followed by defaults on payments to beneficiaries. Retired teachers,
police officers, and other government employees will not receive
their retirement benefits on schedule. The prelude is underway.
Underfunded pension plans have already played a central role in
1. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Ctr. for Research at Bos. Coll., Can State and Local Pensions
Muddle Through?, 15 ST. & LOC. PENSION PLANS 1, 3 (2011), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2011/03/slp_15.pdf; Joshua D. Rauh, Are State Public Pensions Sustainable? Why the
Federal Government Should Worry About State Pension Liabilities, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 585 (2010), avail-
able at http://ntj.tax.org/wwtax/ntjrec.nsf/FB6C0589369AA873852577A8003FB784/$FILE/
Article%2008_Rauh.pdf.
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the bankruptcy filings of Detroit, Michigan;2 Stockton, California;3
and Central Falls, Rhode Island.4 In Detroit, for example, the pro-
posed restructuring of the city’s debt contemplates “significant cuts
in accrued, vested pension amounts for both active and currently
retired persons.”5 Other municipalities are also edging closer to fi-
nancial distress due to underfunded pensions.6 For example,
according to the New York Times, “The pension fund for retired Chi-
cago teachers stands at risk of collapse.”7 The mayor of Chicago
estimates that meeting the city’s pension obligations would require
more than doubling existing property taxes.8
2. See City of Detroit Bankruptcy Filing for the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern
District of Michigan, Case 13-53846, http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/apps/detroit/
DetroitBK.cfm.
3. See City of Stockton Bankruptcy Court Filings 2014, http://www.stocktongov.com/
government/departments/manager/bankruptcy/bkCourtFilings14.html.
4. See City of Central Falls Bankruptcy Plan, http://centralfallsri.us/wp-content/
themes/2012CF/assets/FinancialInfo/BankruptcyPlan/ExhibitE-RestructuredBenefit.pdf.
5. CITY OF DETROIT, OFFICE OF THE EMERGENCY MANAGER, PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS 109
(June 14, 2013), http://www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4206913614.pdf; see also Alana
Semuels, Detroit Bankruptcy Plan Includes Deep Pension Cuts, L.A. TIMES, February 22, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-detroit-bankruptcy-20140222,0,3941443.story.html
(“In the plan, which probably will be amended in the weeks ahead, police, firefighters and
those departments’ retirees will take a 10% cut to their current pension payment. The pen-
sions of all other city employees and retirees will be cut more than three times as much: 34%.
Neither group will receive cost of living adjustments in the future.”); Plan of Adjustment
of Debt of City of Detroit at 30-32, In re Detroit, Michigan (Feb. 21, 2014) (No. 13-53846),
available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/detroit/docket2708.pdf; Dis-
closure Statement with respect to Plan for the Adjustment of Debts of the City of Detroit, at
4-8, In re Detroit, Michigan (Feb. 21, 2014) (No. 13-53846), available at http://www.detroitmi
.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Bankruptcy%20Information/Disclosure%20Statement%20_Plan
%20for%20the%20Adjustment%20of%20Debts%20of%20the%20City%20of%20Detroit
.pdf. .
6. See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Chicago Sees Pension Crisis Drawing Near,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/06/us/chicago-sees-pension-
crisis-drawing-near.html?pagewanted=all”&_r=0.
7. Id.
8. Recent Illinois legislation reduces cost of living allowances applied to the benefits of
certain Chicago public employees (other than public safety workers), requires increased con-
tributions from these employees, would divert state revenue sharing payments from the city
to its pension funds if pension funding targets are not met, and authorizes Chicago to tempo-
rarily impose higher fees on telephone land lines and cell phone service until the local
election cycle is completed. Pub. Act 98-0641, effective June 6, 2014, http://chicagotonight
.wttw.com/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/SB1922.pdf#overlay-context=2014/
06/10/funding-chicagos-pensions, Pub. Act 98-0634, effective June 6, 2014, http://www.ilga
.gov/legislation/publicacts/98/098-0634.htm. The legislation is expected to be challenged
on the grounds that the Illinois constitution does not permit reductions in the benefits of
current or retired employees. See also Rahmbo’s Toughest Mission: Can Rahm Emmanuel Save
Chicago from Financial Calamity?, ECONOMIST, Jun. 14, 2014, available at http://www.economist
.com/news/united-states/21604165-can-rahm-emanuel-save-chicago-financial-calamity-
rahmbos-toughest-mission; Sophia Tareen, Gov. Quinn Signs Partial Pension Overhaul, AP, Jun.
9, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/quinn-decide-monday-chicago-pension-overhaul;
Tom Aaron, Illinois Supreme Court Casts Doubt on Recent State and Local Pension Reform Efforts, a
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The problem is not confined to the municipal level. Using opti-
mistic projections of the short-term returns that public pension
plans will earn, Joshua Rauh recently estimated that as many as a
dozen underfunded state pension plans might exhaust their
reserves over the next ten years, starting with Illinois in 2018, then
Connecticut, Indiana, and New Jersey in 2019.9 That would be a
very serious problem for a pension plan: it’s not like running out of
gas on the way to work in the morning, it’s closer to running out of
jet fuel on a transatlantic flight.
Once a pension plan exhausts its reserves, it faces the same di-
lemma year after year simply to stay even: attempting to fund
current retiree benefits out of cash flow while still setting aside ade-
quate funds for the accruing benefits of current employees. Yet a
pension plan in this predicament will have failed to satisfy even the
latter obligation for significant periods of time. For example, in or-
der to prevent defaults on the pension obligations to retired state
employees, state revenues might have to increase by twenty percent
in Indiana and by thirty-five percent in Illinois and New Jersey. Col-
orado, which could see its pension reserves exhausted by 2022,
would at that point require potential tax increases of over fifty per-
cent to avoid defaulting on its pension obligations.10 These revenue
demands would not be temporary. Additionally, the financial bur-
den could be significantly higher for states with plans that fail to
achieve their targeted investment returns. If governments are una-
ble to sufficiently reduce their budgets or increase taxes in a timely
manner, large numbers of former employees, including teachers
and police officers, might face grave financial difficulties.
Many state and local officials continue to deny that public pen-
sions are at risk.11 Additionally, from time to time members of
Congress insist that there is no possibility of a federal bailout of
Credit Negative, U.S. PUB. FIN. WKLY. CREDIT OUTLOOK, Jul. 10, 2014, at 4, https://docs.google
.com/file/d/0B4Bi-iePG1O6NEhWYy1VY0NoOVU/edit?pli=1.
9. Rauh, supra note 1, at 596; cf. Charles Gasparino, Morgan’s Big Secret: The Coming
Muni Bond Crisis, N.Y. POST, Jun. 17, 2012, http://nypost.com/2012/06/18/morgans-big-se
cret/ (“In New York, for example, JP Morgan said state officials would have to immediately
cut spending by 12.3 percent or raise taxes on everyone by 7.4 percent. And [they would have
to] make these tax hikes and budget cuts permanent for the next two decades to fully fund
public-employee pensions. New Jersey faces an even bigger hole. Even after [Governor]
Christie’s reforms, it would still have to cut spending 30.8 percent or raise taxes another 17.2
percent, keeping them in place for two decades, to solve the problem.”).
10. These projected revenue increases are based on the ratio of annual pension benefits
to state revenues in 2008. The projections assume that states will not divert revenues allocable
to current employees’ benefits to fund retired workers’ benefits. Rauh, supra note 1, at 596.
11. See discussion infra Part I.A.3.
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public pension plans.12 So far, these positions have been costless to
maintain. Therefore, they mean very little. When the prospect of
pension defaults spreads beyond a few moderately-sized cities and
begins to threaten a number of state plans, the political dynamics of
the issue will shift. Unequivocal rejections of a federal role in this
area will give way to the real possibility of a federal bailout of se-
verely underfunded public pension plans.
A federal bailout of public plans will be controversial, but, in the
end, some sort of federal financial support is likely. The numerous
recent bailouts of banks and manufacturers13 might be distinguisha-
ble, technically,14 but politically the incongruity could be hard to
explain away. Furthermore, the federal government already insures
private sector pension benefits;15 should payments to retired public
employees come up short, the case for treating public plans differ-
ently than private sector plans will deteriorate. The federal
government may be able to tolerate a few isolated public pension
plans defaults—just as it permitted Lehman Brothers to fail in
12. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Tom Coburn, Burr, Coburn, Thune Introduce Public
Employee Pension Transparency Act (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.coburn.senate.gov/pub
lic/index.cfm/2013/4/burr-coburn-thune-introduce-public-employee-pension-transparency-
act; cf. JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, REPUBLICAN STAFF COMMENTARY, The Pending State Pen-
sions Crisis 9, http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=6bdeeee
9-4560-4904-bb2e-73cea6de06ab.
13. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO L.J. 435, 437 (2011); J.W.
Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. REG. 283,
294–295 (2010); Cheryl Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 149, 156–59 (2010). Daniel E. Teclaw, U.S. Government Cost to Resolve and Relaunch Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac Could Approach $700 Billion, STANDARD & POOR’S (Nov. 4, 2010, 9:42 PM),
http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&assetID=
1245235044878 (“Standard & Poor’s estimates that the ultimate taxpayer cost to resolve Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac could reach $280 billion . . . . That $280 billion, however, could
swell to $685 billion, by our estimate, with the establishment of a new entity to replace Fannie
and Freddie that the government would initially capitalize.”). See also Bailout Recipients,
PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list (last updated Aug. 12, 2014); The
Bailout: Initiatives and Programs, PROPUBLICA, http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/pro
grams (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
14. David Skeel contends that “[b]ailouts are most defensible if the issue is liquidity—a
temporary crisis in funding—rather than insolvency” and that while recently bailed out banks
were primarily threatened by illiquidity, the financial difficulties of state and local govern-
ments are not predominantly related to liquidity. David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 704–05 (2012).
15. See, e.g., DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: FI-
NANCIAL CONDITION, POTENTIAL RISKS AND POLICY OPTIONS (June 15, 2005), http://www.cbo
.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/64xx/doc6426/06-15-pbgc.pdf (“As a practical
matter, however, the public probably views the pension insurance system as carrying an im-
plicit federal guarantee. Consequently, many observers expect that if PBGC became
insolvent, the Congress would feel compelled to provide direct assistance from general
revenues.”).
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200816—but a series of failures spread throughout the nation would
be another matter entirely. The time is ripe to consider an effective
framework for federal intervention.
It is true that many state and local governments have already in-
stituted some reforms of their employee pension plans. For the
most part, however, these reforms have been directed at the bene-
fits provided to new hires,17 while the looming crisis is driven by the
benefits of current and retired public employees. Those benefits
have typically been immune from reform, and, as a result, the re-
forms currently being imposed are unlikely to significantly reduce
the prospect of public pension plan defaults in the near future.18
Only the federal government has sufficient financial resources and
legal authority to assure that the most seriously underfunded public
pension plans do not default. A federal program could authorize
the sponsors of its regulated plans to revise their existing employ-
ees’ benefits with respect to future services. This is an option that
private employers have always possessed, but one that is denied to
public employers in many states.19 The flexibility to adjust the re-
tirement benefits of existing public employees in this way would
permit more significant reforms at the state and local level.
This Article proposes that the federal government accept that it
may be called upon to provide financial aid to several sizable public
pension funds and act to meet the crisis on its own terms. The
sooner the federal government confronts the matter, the more ef-
fectively it can contain the crisis—and the cost to the Treasury. The
financial burden of federal support will be substantial, but the ex-
pense will only represent costs that, inevitably, someone must bear.
If it were clear that the costs of underfunded public plans could
be distributed among only the taxpayers of the sponsoring jurisdic-
tions, then the case for a federal role would be weaker.
Unfortunately, it appears that in many cases the alternative distribu-
tees, at least in the short run, are United States taxpayers versus
16. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 343
(Jan. 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (“The inconsis-
tency of federal government decisions in not rescuing Lehman after having rescued Bear
Stearns and the GSEs [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—government sponsored entities], and
immediately before rescuing AIG, added to uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.”).
17. See Part I.B (Public Sector Pensions).
18. Cf. Rick Lyman & Mary Williams Walsh, Efforts to Rein in Public-Sector Pension Costs are
Falling Short, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2014, http://nyti.ms/1pkgvnb (“[P]ension ex-
perts say that while some [state pension reforms] have whittled state shortfalls . . . none have
come close to closing their pension gaps quickly enough to keep pace with a rapidly aging—
and retiring—public work force.”).
19. See Part I.B.2 (Legal Status of Public Employee Pension Benefits).
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retired public servants. If there are villains in the public pensions
crisis—negligent or cynical public officials or their constituents—
standing by while public pensions default is unlikely to punish
them.
Federal aid for troubled public pension plans must come with
strings. This is essential both financially and politically. The federal
government should condition eligibility for federal support on a
state’s consent to federal regulation of all of the state’s public pen-
sion plans, local as well as state. Federal regulation of public plans
would resemble the federal regulation of private pension plans and
would include minimum funding requirements similar to those im-
posed on private sector plans. In line with federalism principles, a
state could opt out of federal oversight, but then public plans in
that state would be ineligible for federal financial assistance.
Public pension plans may weather the next decade or so without
the need for federal support. At that point, however, the financial
condition of many public plans could be more precarious than it is
today. Even if a fiscal emergency lies somewhat further down the
road, federal involvement can provide a framework for more signifi-
cant progress in strengthening the balance sheets of public pension
funds.
I. EMPLOYEE PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
Most full-time jobs in the United States offer a retirement plan.20
There are two principal types of pensions: defined benefit plans
and defined contribution plans. For either type of plan, an em-
ployer contributes to a fund or trust on behalf of an employee, with
the expectation that the employee will not receive benefits from the
arrangement until retirement or at least until the employee stops
working for that employer.
In a typical defined contribution plan, an employer contributes
money to an individual account held by a financial institution. The
funds in the account are invested in stocks, bonds, and other assets,
sometimes on behalf of the employee according to established
guidelines, sometimes at the direction of the employee, with deduc-
tions taken out for administrative expenses as well as investment
losses. For a defined contribution plan, the balance in the em-
ployee’s account at (and after) retirement determines the benefits.
20. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., News Release: Employee Benefits in the United States (Mar. 2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf.
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The plan sponsor is responsible for making specified annual contri-
butions—typically proportional to an employee’s annual wages or
salary, or based on the success of the business—but the sponsor is
not exposed to the risk of poor performance by the plan’s invest-
ments. In defined contribution plans, strong investment
performance means higher retirement benefits, and lower returns
result in smaller pensions.
A typical defined benefit pension plan provides an employee an
annual payment at retirement that is based upon the number of
years the employee works for the employer and the employee’s av-
erage salary over several years immediately before retirement. For
example, the payment might be calculated by using two percent of
the product of years worked times average salary for five years
before retirement. Although the employer usually sets money aside
and invests it to support its future pension commitments, defined
benefit pension payments are not tied to the performance of the
pension fund’s investments. Accordingly, while the employee bears
the risk of poor investment performance in a defined contribution
plan, the employer bears the risk in a defined benefit plan. Because
determining the adequately of a defined benefit plan’s funding can
be more difficult, at least in the short run, the risk of underfunded
employee pensions is largely confined to this type of plan.21
The trend in the private sector is to move away from providing
defined benefit pensions and to offer employees defined contribu-
tion pensions instead.22 Some of the shift has been attributed to the
way in which the federal government regulates private sector
plans.23 Private sector employee pension plans are regulated by the
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Labor under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).24 ER-
ISA requires pension plans to make regular reports on their
financial condition and imposes funding standards, such as requir-
ing private sector defined benefit plans to fully fund the retirement
benefits employees accrue.25 ERISA also established a federal
21. Although the problem of underfunding is not limited to public sector plans, see, e.g.,
McGraw-Hill Financial, S&P 500 2012 Pensions and Other Post Employment Benefits
(OPEB): The Final Frontier 9 (2013), http://www.spindices.com/documents/research/sp-
500-2012-pensions-and-opeb-201307.pdf, the issue of underfunded private sector plans is be-
yond the scope of this paper.
22. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIVATE PEN-
SION PLAN BULLETIN, HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS, 1–2 (2011 Data Release Version 1.0
June 2013), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/historicaltables.pdf.
23. Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004).
24. Pub. L. 93–406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29
U.S.C.).
25. 26 U.S.C. §§ 412, 430 (2012).
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agency, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), within
the Department of Labor, to insure the benefits of private plans.26
The PBGC charges an insurance premium27 to private employers
with pension plans and pays benefits28 to retired employees if a plan
defaults.
A. Public Sector Pensions
1. Introduction
State and local government pensions are generally defined bene-
fit pensions that require some contribution by the employee.29
(Generally, the benefit payments include an inflation adjustment—
a cost of living allowance, or COLA.) For defined benefit plans, the
retirement benefit does not depend on the investment returns of
the pension fund. For example, an Illinois public school teacher
would be required to contribute 9.4% of gross earnings toward re-
tirement.30 Under current law, an Illinois public school teacher who
began teaching in 2001 and retires at age sixty, after teaching thirty
years, would receive a benefit equal to approximately two-thirds of
the teacher’s average salary over the last four years of teaching. If
that average (late career) salary were $100,000, say, then the pen-
sion would be $66,000. This represents a credit of 2.2% for each
year of service, applied to the average salary at the end of the
teacher’s career.31 Generally, the annual benefit is increased by 3%
each year as an inflation adjustment, so here the benefit would be
about $68,000 the next year, $70,000 the following year, and so
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
27. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Premium Rates, http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/prem/
premium-rates.html.
28. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., Guaranteed Benefits, http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/ben
efits/guaranteed-benefits.html.
29. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-983T, STATE AND LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENT PENSION PLANS, CURRENT STRUCTURE AND FUNDED STATUS, STATEMENT OF BARBARA
D. BOVBJERG, DIRECTOR EDUCATION, WORKFORCE, AND INCOME SECURITY 2, 4 (July 10, 2008),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08983t.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE UNDERFUNDING OF
STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS 2–3 (May 2011), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12084/05-04-pensions.pdf.
30. TRS, ONLINE MEMBER GUIDE, TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF ILLI-
NOIS 11 (August 2009), http://www.ediillinois.org/ppa/docs/00/00/00/02/33/94/
20100106210355_guide.pdf.
31. Id. at 24; 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-133 (2012), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/
fulltext.asp?DocName=004000050K16-133. ($66,000 = $100,000× 30× 0.02.) Recently enacted
Illinois pension reforms, Illinois Pub. Act 98-599, which largely targets the benefits of new
employees as well as the cost of living increases for benefits of most employees, does not
significantly alter these terms.
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on.32 Typically, an Illinois public school teacher would be outside
the federal social security system;33 neither the employer nor the
employee would pay the annual 6.2% tax on the employee’s sal-
ary,34 and the employee would not be eligible for social security
retirement benefits.
The structure of the Illinois system is fairly representative of most
state and local government pensions,35 although the level of bene-
fits varies from plan to plan and the majority of state and local
government employees do participate in the social security system.36
(Defined benefit pension plans for police and firefighters have sim-
ilar features, although they differ in some respects because public
safety careers are normally shorter.37) In general, in the public sec-
tor, annual retirement payments in defined benefit pension plans
are determined according to the following formula:38
32. See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-133.1(a)(3) (2012). In some cases, the annual benefit
increases described in the text would be reduced under recently enacted pension reforms.
Ill. Pub. Act 98-599, effective July 1, 2014, enacted December 5, 2013; 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
16-133.1(a-1), (a-2) (2012), http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/98/PDF/098-0599
.pdf. At the time of this writing, the Illinois pension reforms have been stayed, http://www
.surs.com/pdfs/news/Restraining_Order_and_Preliminary_Injunction.pdf. See also Associ-
ated Press, Illinois: Judge Halts Pension Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A17 (temporary
stay), http://nyti.ms/1sPSYvd.
33. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(7) (2006); 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/21-103 (2012); see also U.S. GOV-
ERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-983T, SOCIAL SECURITY, ISSUES REGARDING THE
COVERAGE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, STATEMENT OF BARBARA D. BOVBJERG, DIRECTOR EDUCATION,
WORKFORCE, AND INCOME SECURITY 3–4 (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/
118512.pdf.
34. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101(a), 3111(a) (2006).
35. Because, for the most part, pension plans reforms do not alter the benefits of ex-
isting public workers, this § I.A.1 describes the typical characteristics of the plans of current
employees and retirees of public pension plans. Section I.B surveys recent legislative revi-
sions, which largely impact only new hires.
36. See Robert L. Clark et al., The Evolution of Public Pension Plans, in THE FUTURE OF
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 241 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Gary Anderson eds., 2009).
The variation in coverage of state and local government employees by Social Security is dis-
cussed in U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-983T, SOCIAL SECURITY,
ISSUES REGARDING THE COVERAGE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, STATEMENT OF BARBARA D. BOVBJERG,
DIRECTOR EDUCATION, WORKFORCE, AND INCOME SECURITY 3 (Nov. 6, 2007) (“[A]bout one-
fourth of public employees are not covered by Social Security for various historical
reasons.”).
37. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2008 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 12–13 (May 2010), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/
crs/2008_retirement.pdf; Olivia S. Mitchell et al., Developments in State and Local Pension Plans,
in PENSIONS FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 15, 21–22 (Olivia S. Mitchell & E. Hustead eds., 2000).
38. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2010 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 24 (Dec. 2011), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/crs/
2010_retirement.pdf; DAVID RAJNES, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, STATE AND LO-
CAL RETIREMENT PLANS: INNOVATION AND RENOVATION (July 2001), at 17, http://www.ebri
.org/pdf/briefspdf/0701ib.pdf.
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Terminal Compensation × Years Employed × Multiplier
Terminal Compensation is typically the average compensation over
the employee’s three most highly compensated years; a five-year av-
erage is also common.39 Years Employed is the total number of years
of the employee’s service for the government employer. The Multi-
plier is the rate at which benefits accrue per year of service. A recent
survey found that multipliers were usually in the range between
1.7% and 2.1%. The multiplier tends to be higher for jurisdictions
in which the government employees are outside Social Security,
with an average of 2.2% as opposed to 1.95%.40 While in the public
sector defined benefit pension plans provide for employee contri-
butions, in practice, the employer often assumes the obligation.41
Apart from police and firefighters, plans typically allow for retire-
ment with full benefits after age fifty-five with thirty years of service.
Frequently, employees have an option for early retirement, which
usually comes with an adjustment to the benefits formula. Vesting
generally occurs at five years or fewer of employment, although
some plans require up to ten years of service; a couple of plans
provide for immediate vesting.42
State and local government pension plans usually adjust benefits
to account for inflation. Many determine the adjustment based on
the Consumer Price Index. For example, Massachusetts provides
for up to a three percent cost of living adjustment on the first
39. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2010 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 27–29 (Dec. 2011), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/
crs/2010_retirement.pdf.
40. See id. at 24–25 (suggesting that 1.95% average multiplier for plans in which employ-
ees are covered by Social Security “may be somewhat misleadingly low because a number of
plans increase their multiplier rates following a certain number of years in service; generally
15, 25 or 30 years.”).
41. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2008 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 19 (May 2010), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/crs/
2008_retirement.pdf. There are, for example, tax advantages to providing incremental em-
ployee compensation in this form instead of via straight salary. See id.; cf. 26 U.S.C. § 414(h)
(2006) (specifying that such contributions “shall not be treated as having been made by the
employer if it is designated as an employee contribution.”); CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANA-
LYST’S OFFICE, STATE “PICKUP” OF EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (Jan. 1985) (“The
pickup program, however, is accomplished not through additional employer expenditures,
but by manipulating the employee’s salary on paper.”), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/
1985/01_85_state_pickup_of_employee_retirement_contributions.pdf; see, e.g., CITY CLUB OF
PORTLAND, OREGON PERS: BURDENED BY THE PAST, POISED FOR THE FUTURE 10 (May 27, 2011),
http://research.pdxcityclub.org/sites/default/files/reports/PERS_2011_0.pdf (“[T]oday
approximately 70% of employees receive the pick-up [of the six percent employee contribu-
tion to the Oregon Public Employee Retirement System].”).
42. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2008 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 20–24 (May 2010), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/
crs/2008_retirement.pdf.
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$12,000 of benefits, setting a ceiling of $360.43 New Jersey’s adjust-
ment is sixty percent of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).44 Illinois
and a few other states simply increase benefits for most employees
by three percent each year, independent of the actual rate of
inflation.45
For the most part, public sector plans fall outside the scope of
federal supervision. In the 1970s, the immediate problems stimulat-
ing ERISA involved insolvent private sector defined benefit plans,
and there was concern that federal oversight of public sector plans
would offend federalism principles.46 Public sector plans are not
currently subject to federal minimum funding requirements.47 Pub-
lic plans tend to follow the standards established by the
Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB). GASB promul-
gates accounting guidelines for state and local governments.
Although GASB is not a regulatory body, does not conduct investi-
gations, and does not have enforcement authority, its standards are
influential. In some cases, compliance with GASB rules is mandated
by state law or effectively compelled by financial markets that invest
in public debt. Since 1994, GASB guidelines have required public
pension plans to provide regular reports on their financial condi-
tion and have specified the relevant accounting principles for these
reports. GASB’s standards, however, are significantly looser than
those that ERISA imposes on private sector plans.48
43. FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE MASSACHUSETTS CONTRIBU-
TORY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 4 (Oct. 7, 2009), http://economics.mit.edu/files/4598.
44. N.J. DEP’T TREASURY, MEMBERS HANDBOOK, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT System
30 (March 2011). The state uses the CPI for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-
W).
45. See WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2008 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EM-
PLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 34–35 (May 2010), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/
crs/2008_retirement.pdf; see also ARKANSAS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, CONTRIBU-
TORY, MEMBERS HANDBOOK 37 (2009); TEACHERS RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS, ESSENTIAL
FACTS ABOUT TRS 3 (June 2011) (Tier 1 only). As of 2011, new employees are assigned to the
Tier II plan. “Changes from the ‘Tier I’ pension law include raising the minimum age to
draw a retirement benefit to age 67 with 10 years of service, imposing a limit on the amount
of salary that may be used to calculate retirement benefits, and limiting cost-of-living annuity
adjustments to the lesser of three percent or 1/2 of the annual increase in the Consumer Price
Index, not compounded. The retirement formula is unchanged.” Id. at 2. A three percent
COLA also applies to retired employee beneficiaries of the Florida Retirement System. How-
ever, current Florida employees will not be eligible for a cost of living adjustment with
respect to service after July 1, 2011. Fla. Stat. § 121.101 (2011). Florida law provides for resto-
ration of the flat three percent COLA in 2016 “[s]ubject to the availability of funding and the
Legislature enacting sufficient employer contributions specifically for the purpose of [restor-
ing the 3 percent] cost-of-living adjustment.” Fla. Stat. § 121.101(5) (2011).
46. See discussion infra Part III.C.
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 3(32), 4(b)(1) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 412(e)(2)(C) (2006).
48. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1156, STATE AND LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT STATUS OF BENEFIT STRUCTURES, PROTECTIONS AND
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2. Legal Status of Public Employee Pension Benefits
In most cases, the level of pension benefits and the terms of state
or local government pension plans are very real, legally binding
commitments.49 But the extent of protection varies by jurisdiction.
In the private sector, the rule is that accrued benefits can be for-
feited only before they vest.50 For example, a private sector
employee might earn $100,000 straight salary and accrue $2000 to-
ward a pension annually. Then, after three years on the job, the
employee would have accrued $6000 in annual retirement benefits.
If the benefits have not yet vested and the employee changes jobs,
then the employee loses the accrued retirement benefits.51 If the
benefits had vested, then the employee would have the right to re-
ceive the benefits, under the terms of the plan—which might mean
that the employee would have to wait until retirement to access the
money.52 This guarantee extends to virtually all public pension
plans,53 although for public plans benefits may not vest for some
time.54
In a number of states, the protections government employees re-
ceive are significantly stronger than the security guaranteed to
vested pension benefits under ERISA. With respect to services an
employee has not yet rendered, a private sector employer may re-
duce the rate at which pension benefits accrue or even eliminate
FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR FUNDING FUTURE COSTS 8 (Sept. 2007), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-1156/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-07-1156.pdf; J. Fred Gierz &
Leslie E. Papke, Public Pension Plans: Myths and Realities for State Budgets, 60 Nat’l Tax J. 305,
317 (2007), http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/60/2/ntj-v60n02p305-23-public-pension-plans-
myths.pdf.
49. See, e.g., Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1997); Legislature v. Eu, 816
P.2d 1309, 1333 (Cal. 1991); Peterson v. Fire & Police Pension Ass’n, 759 P.2d 720, 724
(Colo. 1988); Oregon State Police Officers’ Assoc. v. Oregon, 918 P.2d 765, 773 (Or. 1996);
Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 517 n.12 (Me. 1993).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006);
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981); Modzelewski v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 14 F.3d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1994).
51. Sutton v. Weirton Steel, 724 F2d 406, 410 (4th Cir. 1983).
52. Chambless v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 772 F.2d 1032, 1041
(2d Cir. 1985).
53. 26 U.S.C. § 411(e); 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(7)(1974); Mary Beth Braitman & Terry A.M.
Mumford, Legal Advisory Report, in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE DESIGN AND FUNDING
OF RETIREMENT AND RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS PLANS FOR STATE EMPLOYEES AND TEACHERS 5,
App. A (Vt. Dec. 2009); Amy B Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform: The Legal Framework,
EDUC. FIN. & POLICY 617, 638–40 (2010).
54. Clark et al., supra note 36, at 248–50, 263—65; see, e.g., City of East Point v. Sea-
graves, 524 S.E.2d 755, 757 (Ga. App. 1999); Alldredge v. Okla. Firefighters Pension &
Retirement Bd., 816 P.2d 580, 582 (Okla. App. 1991) (vesting of benefits of firefighters em-
ployed before 1981 occurred at retirement); Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 516 (Me. 1993);
McGrath v. R.I. Retirement Bd, 88 F3d 12, 17 (1st Cir 1996).
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further accruals.55 In contrast, in a significant number of states, a
government sponsor of a pension plan is bound to the terms ex-
isting on the date an employee begins work or enters the plan; any
adjustments detrimental to current employees must be offset by
beneficial adjustments. In a sense, at some point, public employees
may become vested in a plan’s terms as well as their accrued bene-
fits. For convenience, the Article will refer to this type of legal
protection for a public pension as term vesting.
For example, suppose that an employee starts working in 2012
for an employer whose only retirement plan is a conventional de-
fined benefit plan, with Terminal Compensation defined as an
employee’s average annual compensation over the final three years
of employment and with a multiplier of two percent. An employee
working for thirty years and earning $100,000 in each of the three
years before retirement would receive $60,000 per year in retire-
ment. If the vesting period for the 2012 plan is five years, then an
employee who stopped working for this employer in 2015 would
not receive any pension from the employer’s plan, but a worker
who worked for five years at an annual salary of $50,000, would be
entitled to a pension at retirement of $10,000 per year. If the em-
ployer were a private employer subject to ERISA, the employer
could terminate the pension plan in 2017, for example, and cease
to offer any retirement plan. An employee who worked for this em-
ployer until 2042 would be entitled to a pension at retirement
based on five years of service, not the thirty years that the employee
would have been entitled to apply if the terms of the 2012 plan had
remained in force.
If the 2012 plan were a public plan, however, then in many juris-
dictions not only would the government employer be prohibited
from ceasing to offer an existing employee a pension plan after
2017, the employer would be prohibited from substituting a de-
fined contribution plan for the defined benefit plan at that point.
With respect to a public-sector employee hired in 2012, in 2017 the
public employer could not even reduce the multiplier applied to
2018 and beyond—unless the terms could be shown to be at least as
generous as the terms of the 2012 plan.56 In these jurisdictions,
55. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(a)(3). (4) (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 4041(b) (2012); Herman v.
Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 423 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2005). There are
notice requirements if a plan amendment reduces future benefit accruals. ERISA § 204(h),
29 U.S.C. § 1054(h) (2012).
56. Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1057 (Alaska 1981); Thurston v. Judges Ret.
Plan, 876 P.2d 545, 548 (Ariz. 1994); Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1333 (Cal. 1991)
(“[O]n commencing to serve the state the officer thereupon acquires a vested right to earn,
through continued service, additional pension benefits in an amount reasonably comparable
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however, public employers need not provide new employees pen-
sions at all, and, if they do, the new employees’ benefits can be less
generous than those provided to existing employees.
Among those states with term vesting, the legal basis for the rule
varies. A number of state constitutions contain provisions directly
addressing the status of public employee retirement benefits. For
example, the New York State Constitution provides: “After July first,
nineteen hundred forty, membership in any pension or retirement
system of the state or of a civil division thereof shall be a contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or im-
paired.”57 The Arizona and Illinois constitutions contain similar
language.58 In Alaska, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Michigan, the provi-
sions use the same language, except that they specify that “accrued
benefits . . . shall not be diminished or impaired.”59 The courts of
Alaska, Arizona, Illinois and New York have construed their respec-
tive constitutional provisions as entailing term vesting, in some
cases relying on the legislative history of the clause.60
In the remainder of the term-vesting states, the requirement of
term vesting is derived from federal or state constitutional contract
protections.61 In these cases, many state courts appear to base their
construction on the public policy consideration that acceptance of
public employment limits an employee’s future employment op-
tions to such an extent that prospective employees would expect
to those available when he or she first took office.”); Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614, 617
(Cal. 1978); Kraus v. Bd. of Trustees, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1289 (Ill. App. 1979); Singer v. To-
peka, 607 P.2d 467 (Kan. 1980); Madden v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 729 N.E.2d 1095,
1098 (Mass. 2000); Calabro v. City of Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995); Pub. Emp.
Ret. Bd. v. Washoe Cnty., 615 P.2d 972, 974-75 (Nev. 1980); Birnbaum v. N.Y. State Teachers
Ret. Sys., 152 N.E.2d 241, 245 (N.Y. 1958); Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n v. Regan, 525 N.E.2d 1, 3
(N.Y. 1988); Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n. v Oregon, 918 P.2d 765, 779 (Or. 1996); cf. id. at
775; Bowles v. Wash. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 847 P.2d 440, 446 (Wash. 1993); Dorward v ILWU-
PMA Pension Plan, 452 P.2d 258, 262 (Wash. 1969). See also Alicia H. Munnell & Laura
Quinby, Ctr. for Research at Bos. Coll., Legal Constraints on Changes in State and Local Pensions,
25 ST. & LOC. PENSION PLANS 1, 2 (2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
slp_25.pdf.
57. N.Y. Const. art. V, §7.
58. Ariz. Const. art. 12, § 7; Ill. Const. art. 13, § 5.
59. Ark. Const. art. 12, § 7; Haw. Const. art. 16, § 2; La. Const. art 10, § 29; Mich. Const.
art. 9, § 19 (emphasis added). The Constitution of Texas also contains protections for “ac-
crued pension benefits.” Tex. Const. art. 16, § 66.
60. Hammond, 627 P.2d at 1057; Sheffield v. Alaska Pub. Emps.’ Ass’n, 732 P.2d 1083,
1087 (Alaska 1983); Thurston, 876 P.2d at 548; Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1289; Birnbaum, 152
N.E.2d at 245.
61. E.g., “No State shall . . . pass . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10. This is the federal Contract Clause. Its inclusion in our great charter
appears to be connected to the practice of some States, when we were but a Confederation,
of requiring creditors to accept nominal consideration in satisfaction of debts. See Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 199 (1819).
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the benefits of term vesting before embarking on such a career.62
For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court explains the basis of the
term-vesting principle as follows:
[W]e recognize that the availability of and security afforded by
a pension plan may draw employees into government ser-
vice. . . . Firefighters who accepted employment with the City
of Omaha after the implementation of the [benefit provision]
reasonably expected to receive the [benefit] if they remained
in public employment, and that expectation provided a power-
ful incentive to remain working for the city. [New employees]
would have no such expectation and would not be entitled to
the [benefit].63
In the Nebraska cases, the court does not acknowledge that pri-
vate employers attract employees without committing to maintain
the terms of a pension throughout an employee’s tenure. The
courts may regard it as self-evident that pensions have been a more
significant feature of compensation in the public sector than in the
private sector.64 Perhaps it is also plausible that labor markets for
public school teachers and public safety workers differ systemati-
cally from those for generic private sector jobs.65
Although there is some diversity among the states regarding cur-
rent government employees’ pension security, generally the legal
rights of retirees to pension benefits is firmly established, with per-
haps some uncertainty at the margins with respect to various cost of
living adjustments.66 In the event that a government pension plan
62. Kern v. Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947); Public Empls.’ Ret. Bd., 615 P.2nd
at 974; Dorward, 452 P.2d at 261 (“The worker loses job mobility and possible wage increases,
but gains pension rights. The employer gains employment stability because he can attract
more competent employees and avoid labor turnover.”); Or. State Police Officers Ass’n, 918 P.2d
at 776.
63. Calabro v. Omaha, 531 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Neb. 1995).
64. See Smith v. Bd. of Trustees La. State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 851 So.2d 1100, 1117–-18 (La.
2003) (“Because of the lower pay that inevitably comes with public service, the benefits of-
fered through state pension plans are undoubtedly one of the primary reasons state
governments can attract and retain better employees.”); Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun.
Emp. Retirement Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Minn. 1983); see also Bernard Jump Jr., Public
Employment, Collective Bargaining, and Employee Wages and Pensions, in STATE AND LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENT AND FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 78 (Catherine Spain ed., 1978).
65. Cf. Maury Gittleman & Brooks Pierce, Compensation for State and Local Government
Workers, 26 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 217, 224 (2012) (“It seems plausible that public sector work-
ers demand a compensation package skewed more towards benefits.”), http://pubs.aeaweb
.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.26.1.217.
66. Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Legal Constraints on Changes in State and Local
Pensions, 25 ST. & LOC. PENSION PLANS 1, 3 (2012); Bartlett v. Cameron, 316 P.3d 889, 895–96
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defaulted on its pension obligations to retired employees, the retir-
ees could demand compensation through state court proceedings.
Whether the retirees could actually obtain money on a timely basis,
however, is much less clear. There is a significant risk that, if a sub-
stantial number government pension plans default, in many cases
retirees will have great difficulty in extracting compensation from
their former government employers through litigation, at least in
the short-run.
3. Financial Status of Public Pension Funds
The state and local retirement funds of many jurisdictions are
financially sound, but, in other jurisdictions, more than a few funds
are edging toward the precipice. Joshua Rauh projects that pension
plans in over ten states will exhaust their funds by 2022, unless they
divert contributions from current employees to fund retiree bene-
fits—a maneuver that may delay a reckoning but sow the seeds of a
more dramatic collapse later on.67 Using the same assumption of no
diversions, the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College
(Boston College CRR) estimates that public pension plans in almost
half of the states will become insolvent, although the study consid-
ers it more “realistic” to assume that plans in distress will use
whatever money they can get their hands on to pay retirees’ bene-
fits.68 Even so, these authors identify seven public plans that are
unlikely to “muddle through.”69
State and local government officials nevertheless continue to
maintain that “[p]ublic pension plans are not in crisis.”70 Recently,
a coalition of public officials asserted that “state and local govern-
ment retirement systems do not require, nor are they seeking,
Federal financial assistance.”71 As with many important issues in the
(N.M. 2013) (citing cases and holding that “any future cost-of-living adjustment to a retire-
ment benefit is merely a year-to-year expectation that, until paid, does not create a property
right under the Constitution”); Justus v. State, No. 12SC906, 2013 WL 4008216 (Colo. Aug. 5,
2013) (scheduling oral argument re question).
67. See Rauh, supra note 1, at 593.
68. Munnell et al., supra note 1, at 10–11.
69. Id. at 3.
70. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, FACTS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PENSIONS (2011), http://www.ilretirementsecurity.org/admin/reports/files/PublicPension
FactSheet110125.pdf.
71. Id. See NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION ET AL., FACTS YOUR SHOULD KNOW 3
(2013) http://www.nasra.org/resources/2013%20Facts%20You%20Should%20Know.pdf;
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES ET AL., 2014 FACTS: STATE AND MUNICIPAL BANK-
RUPTCY, MUNICIPAL BONDS, STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS (2014), http://www.nasra.org/files/
JointPublications/FactsYouShouldKnow.pdf.
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realm of political economy, much of the controversy concerns dis-
count rates.
The accounting methods that public pension plans use them-
selves indicate that the plans have an aggregate deficit of $971
million, with financial assets of $2.7 trillion offset by liabilities of
$3.6 trillion.72 Economists estimate a deficit that is several times
larger. According to Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh, the defi-
cit was at least $2.5 trillion as of June 2009; by another measure, the
deficit stood at $3.39 trillion.73 In another study, using 2012 data,
the Boston College CRR estimates that the deficit is at least $2.7
trillion.74 The economists’ estimates correspond to a funding ratio
of about fifty percent, in contrast to the plans’ reported funding
levels, which would mean that plans were about three-quarters
funded. The ratings agency Moody’s recently adjusted its methodol-
ogy for determining the funding status of public pensions,
producing a dramatically higher estimated deficit. Under Moody’s
revised approach, the total “adjusted net pension liability” of the
public pension plans that it analyzed comes to about $2 trillion for
fiscal year 2011.75
The pronounced disparity between public pension plans’ re-
ported deficits and economists’ estimates stems largely from the
different discount rates used to project plan liabilities. Although in
practice these projections require accounting for benefits spread
out over decades, the importance of the choice of the discount rate
72. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT ADMINISTRATORS, PUBLIC FUND SCORECARD
(May 30, 2014) (summary of findings for fiscal year 2011), http://www.publicfundsurvey
.org/publicfundsurvey/scorecard.asp.
73. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Policy Options for State Pension Systems and their
Impact on Plan Liabilities, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 173, 181 (2011).
74. Alicia H. Munnell et al., Ctr. for Research at Bos. Coll., The Funding of State and Local
Pensions: 2012–2016, 32 ST. & LOC. PENSION PLANS, 1, 4 (2013), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2013/07/slp_32-508.pdf. In a November 2013 paper, Novy-Marx and Rauh
suggest, “Unfunded pension obligations at the state and local level . . . probably top $4 tril-
lion today.” ROBERT NOVY-MARX & JOSHUA RAUH, LINKING BENEFITS TO INVESTMENT
PERFORMANCE IN US PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.stanford.edu/
~rauh/research/NMRPLAANov2013.pdf.
75. MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, REQUEST FOR COMMENT: ADJUSTMENTS TO U.S. STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPORTED PENSION DATA (July 2, 2012), http://s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/686623/moodys-pensions-final-adjustments-sc.pdf (“The proposed adjustments
described in this Request for Comment would nearly triple fiscal 2010 reported unfunded
actuarial accrued liability (“UAAL”) for the 50 states and our rated local governments, in-
creasing UAAL to $2.2 trillion from $766 billion.”); MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, ADJUSTMENTS
TO U.S. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REPORTED PENSION DATA (Apr. 17, 2013), http://gfoa
.org/downloads/MoodysAdjustmentsApril2013.pdf; MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVICE, ADJUSTED
PENSION LIABILITY MEDIANS FOR U.S. STATES, (June 27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/06/27/National-Economy/Graphics/Moodys_
State_Pension_Liability_Medians.pdf.
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can be illustrated by an example involving a single projected pay-
ment many years away.
Suppose that benefit obligations are estimated to be $4 trillion in
twenty years. At a discount rate of eight percent, the present value
of that liability equals about $858 billion:
At a discount rate of four percent, the present value of the liability
is about $1.83 trillion:
The latter discount rate produces a liability that is about twice as
large.76
The reported liabilities and deficits of public pension plans are
generally based on a discount rate in the neighborhood of eight
percent, an estimate of the rate of return a plan will accrue on its
investment assets. Organizations representing public plans justify a
rate in that range by emphasizing that “for the most part, the ex-
pected returns used by public plans accurately reflect the long-term
historical rates of return.”77 The majority of public pension plans’
investments are in equities.78 The proportion of investments allo-
cated to stocks has grown over time and is significantly larger than
for private sector defined benefit plans.79 Equity investments tend
to have notably higher average returns and greater risk.80
In contrast, economists’ estimates of public plan liabilities use
substantially lower discount rates. Novy-Marx and Rauh’s estimates
are based on Treasury rates that range from 0.2% to 2.5% over the
76. At discount rate r, the present value (PV) of an amount X in one year is given by the
formula PV = X/(1+r); at the same discount rate, the present value of X in n years is given by
PV = X/(1+r)n. For example, at a discount rate of ten percent, the present value of $55 in one
year is $55/1.1 = $50.
77. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF PUBLIC EMP. RET. SYS., THE ADVANTAGES OF USING CONVEN-
TIONAL ACTUARIAL APPROACHES FOR VALUING PUBLIC PENSION PLANS 5 (Nov. 2008), http://
www.ncpers.org/files/ResearchSeriesIII.pdf.
78. State Public Pension Investments Shift Over Past 30 Years, The Pew Charitable Trusts &
The Lauren and John Arnold Foundation 3 (June 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/me
dia/Assets/2014/06/PensionInvestments06032014.pdf.
79. C.E. Weller & J. B. Wenger, Prudent Investors: The Asset Allocation of Public Pension
Plans, 8 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 501–25 (2009).
80. The Pew Charitable Trusts & The Lauren and John Arnold Foundation, supra note
78, at 3–4.
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first five years and from 3.5% to 4.3% from ten to thirty years.81 The
Boston College CRR study is based on a discount rate of five per-
cent, which is derived from the yield of the thirty-year Treasury
bond, adjusted upward by about twenty percent to account for the
liquidity premium enjoyed by federal government debt.82 The basis
for the economists’ approach is that public pension plan liabili-
ties—beneficiaries’ claims on their benefits—are fixed under the
terms of the plans and governing state law. The appropriate dis-
count rate for riskless claims is a riskless one.83 From the
perspective of financial economics, although the nature of a pen-
sion plan’s liabilities may be relevant to determining the
appropriate investment strategy for a plan, the composition of a
pension plan’s investment portfolio is not pertinent to determining
the present value of the plan’s liabilities.
As Novy-Marx emphasizes, under the accounting method sanc-
tioned by GASB, a pension plan’s measured liabilities and deficit
could decrease if a plan simply discarded valuable fixed income as-
sets from its portfolio, because doing so could increase the plan’s
projected average rate of return on its remaining assets.84 Accord-
ing to economists Jeffrey Brown and David Wilcox,
In most state and local plans, pension benefits are protected
by constitutional, statutory, or common law guarantees. In
many cases, these guarantees make the benefit promises to
participants virtually free of risk. Finance theory is unambigu-
ous that the discount rate used to value future pension
obligations should reflect the riskiness of the liabilities.85
The economists’ position is notable for lacking the hedging so com-
mon in their profession’s pronouncements: “Discounting liabilities
at an expected rate of return on assets in the plan runs entirely
counter to the logic of financial economics: financial streams of
payment should be discounted at a rate that reflects their risk.”86
81. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEREST RATE HISTORIC YIELD DATA VISUALIZATION FOR
JUNE 30, 2009, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/
Pages/Historic-Yield-Data-Visualization.aspx; Novy-Marx & Rauh, supra note 73.
82. Munnell et al., The Funding of State and Local Pensions, supra note 74, at 4.
83. Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, Discounting State and Local Pension Liabilities,
99 AM. ECON. REV. 538, 538 (2009).
84. ROBERT NOVY-MARX, LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GASB’S METHODOLOGY FOR VALUING
PENSION LIABILITIES 3–5 (June 2012), http://rnm.simon.rochester.edu/research/LIoGMfV
PL.pdf.
85. Brown & Wilcox, supra note 83, at 538.
86. Robert Novy-Marx & Joshua D. Rauh, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and
What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1211, 1211 (2011).
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The conviction of economists that pension plan deficits should
be measured with a riskless discount rate has been endorsed by the
accounting firm of Ernst and Young, the Congressional Budget Of-
fice, and a joint task force of the American Academy of Actuaries
and the Society of Actuaries.87 The actuaries’ Pension Finance Task
Force maintains that reporting pension liabilities based on ex-
pected return on assets tends to “mislead users, encourage
unnecessarily generous compensation, discourage appropriate risk
management of investments and encourage transactions that have
no economic value.”88
In the face of these disputes over the proper measure of public
pension plan liabilities, GASB has largely rejected suggestions that
it move its standards for public plans closer to those for private sec-
tor plans. GASB recently proposed revisions to its guidance that
would theoretically call for some funds to value a portion of their
pension liabilities using a discount rate closer to a risk-free rate of
return: that is, “a tax-exempt, high-quality thirty-year municipal
bond index rate.”89 In most cases, however, funds could continue to
use the higher expected long-term rate of return on plan invest-
ments. According to the GASB proposal, the lower rate would only
come into play when a plan’s current assets and projected future
assets are estimated to fall short of projected benefits; in that case,
the new GASB standards call for a weighted average of the tradi-
tional rate and the municipal bond index rate.90
While the aggregate deficit for public plans is suggestive of the
scale of the problem, the deficit is not distributed proportionately
among jurisdictions or plans. Some government’s plans are in
much better shape than the aggregates would suggest, while the
87. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, RE: EXPOSURE DRAFT ON PENSION ACCOUNTING AND FIN.
REPORTING BY EMP’RS 4 (Oct. 14 2001), http://www.actuary.org/files/publications/
PPC_comments_GASB_PV_111017.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE UNDERFUNDING OF STATE
AND LOCAL PENSIONS 5 (May 2011) (“the fair value approach provides a more complete and
transparent measure of the costs of pension obligations”); ERNST & YOUNG, RE: PROPOSED
STATEMENT, “ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSIONS—AN AMEND-
MENT OF GASB STATEMENT No. 27” 5 (Oct. 14, 2011) http://www.gasb.org/cs/BlobServer?
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175823114549&blob
header=application%2Fpdf (“It is our understanding that these promises have a low risk of
default and as such should be discounted at a rate that has a similar low risk.”).
88. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, RE: EXPOSURE DRAFT ON PENSION ACCOUNTING AND FIN.
REPORTING BY EMPL’RS 10 (Oct. 14, 2001).
89. GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., PENSION ACCOUNTING & FINANCIAL REPORTING
(PROPOSED STATEMENT OF GASB: PLAIN LANGUAGE SUPPLEMENT) 6 (June 27, 2011), http://
www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?site=GASB&c=Document_C&pagename=GASB%2FDocu
ment_C%2FGASBDocumentPage&cid=1176158723597.
90. Id. at 6, 7.
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fiscal condition of others is appreciably worse; it is the financial sta-
tus of individual plans that will determine when a public pension
crisis becomes an unavoidable item on the national agenda. Using
somewhat artificial but instructive assumptions, Joshua Rauh esti-
mates that pension plans in Illinois, Connecticut, Indiana, New
Jersey, Hawaii, Louisiana, and Oklahoma will become insolvent by
2020 and that plans in six additional states will reach that stage by
2022.91 Employing a similar methodology, researchers at the Boston
College CRR estimate that pension plans in almost half the states
will exhaust their funds within that period.92 In each case, the pro-
jections are based on the plans’ expected investment returns.
Both sets of projections assume that the plans will not fund im-
mediate benefit obligations with respect to retirees out of funds
contributed on behalf of current employees for their future bene-
fits. This assumption may exaggerate the urgency of the situation
from a purely practical perspective: if funds contributed for current
workers’ benefits are treated as available to pay retirees’ pensions,
then the Boston College CRR study finds that only six states’ plans
are at risk of insolvency over the next decade using a discount rate
based on expected investment returns.93 The Boston College CRR
study finds another four states’ plans at risk with a rate closer to a
low-risk fixed income rate.94 From a public policy perspective, how-
ever, the more dramatic projections are still significant. To the
extent that government sponsors divert contributions on behalf of
current workers to fund retired employees’ benefits, the underlying
financial vulnerability of a plan is amplified.
B. Recent Public Pension Reforms
As might be expected in a period of tightening government
budgets, the current trend is to offer new hires pension plans that
are less generous in several dimensions. Over the past ten to fifteen
years, state pension reforms have been limited until very recently.
For example, since 1997, new Michigan state employees have had
only a defined contribution plan option.95 New public school teach-
ers in Michigan, who belong to the State’s Public School
Employees’ Retirement System but work for local jurisdictions, con-
tinued to receive defined benefit pensions until 2010 when new
91. Rauh, supra note 1, at 596.
92. Munnell et al., supra note 1, at 8–11.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Mich. Act 487 (1996) (eff. March 1, 1997).
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hires began participating in a hybrid defined benefit, defined con-
tribution (“hybrid”) plan.96 Alaska closed its defined benefit
pension plan to new hires as of July 1, 2006. Since then, new em-
ployees belong to a defined contribution plan.97 As of January 1,
2009, new Georgia state employees belong to a hybrid plan rather
than a defined benefit plan. In the new plan, the multiplier for the
defined benefit program will be one percent, instead of two percent
as in the previous defined benefit plans.98
Public employee pensions generally require contributions by em-
ployees as well as employers. Across the country, the level of
contributions required from employees has been gradually increas-
ing. Now most plans require employees to contribute more than
five percent of their annual salary to support their plan.99 Addition-
ally, early retirement options have been delayed somewhat.100
Particularly in the past few years, as state and local governments
have faced escalating financial pressure across the board,101 the
pace of pension reform at the state level has accelerated.102 Tradi-
tionally, pension reforms have targeted new hires, leaving existing
96. See Mich. Act 75 (2010) (eff. July 1, 2010); see also MICHIGAN PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOY-
EES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 2011 7 (2010).
97. SB FCCS 141(2D FCC), Ch 9 FSSLA 05 (Sept 15, 2005).
98. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Georgia, Old Plan, New Plan GSEPS Plan Guide 15, 17, 18 (2011);
see also Alicia H. Munnell et al., Ctr. for Research at Bos. Coll., A Role for Defined Contribution
Plans in the Public Sector, 16 ST. & LOC. PENSION PLANS 1, 4 (Apr. 2011), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/slp_16-508.pdf.
99. Compare WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2002 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUB.
EMP. RET. SYS. 16 (Dec. 2003), http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/crs/2002_retire
ment.pdf with WLC2010, at 18. Many public employers, however, elect to fund the amounts
nominally required to be provided by their employees. CAROL V. CALHOUN, CYNTHIA L.
MOORE & KEITH BRAINARD, GOV’TAL PLANS ANSWER BOOK 2–38 (2d ed. 2007). Such payments
are not included in an employee’s gross income for federal income tax purposes. 26 U.S.C.
§ 414(h)(2); Rev. Rule 77-462, 1977-2 CB 358.
100. The Wisconsin Legislative Council has been surveying various features of major pub-
lic employee pension plans biennially for many years, and a comparison of the 2002 survey
with the 2010 survey does not reveal substantial trends over that period beyond those noted
in the text. See also WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2012 COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUB-
LIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 13, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/crs/
2012_retirement.pdf. Comparative study (“Between the 2008 and 2010 Reports, 11 plans in-
creased their early retirement provisions. Between the 2010 and 2012 Reports, 19 states
increased their early retirement provisions.”).
101. TRACY GORDON, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCES: WHERE WE’RE GOING, STATE TAX NOTES
339–46 (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/arti
cles/2011/1/31%20state%20local%20finances%20gordon/0131_state_local_finances_gor
don.pdf.
102. RONALD K. SNELL, STATE PENSION POLICY OPTIONS IN 2010 (Nat’l Conf. State Legs.
Mar. 2010); RONALD K. SNELL, PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT PLAN ENACTMENTS IN 2011 STATE
LEGISLATURES 2011 ENACTMENTS 1 [hereinafter SNELL, 2011 ENACTMENTS] (“[I]n all, 41 states
enacted significant revisions to at least one state retirement plan in 2010 or 2011.”); RONALD
K. SNELL, PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT PLAN ENACTMENTS IN 2010 STATE LEGISLATURES (Nat’l
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employees under the same regime that was in place when they were
hired and creating tiers of employees subject to somewhat different
benefit terms depending on date of hire.103 Typically, later tiers en-
joy less generous terms.104 The most recent wave of revisions has
generally preserved this pattern. When reforms impact existing em-
ployees, the modifications have been largely confined to
controlling future COLAs and augmenting required employee con-
tributions—with the exception of recent legislation in Rhode
Island.105
In 2011, Rhode Island enacted legislation that substantially al-
tered retirement benefits for public employees not eligible to retire
before July 1, 2012.106 As of July 1, 2012, a hybrid plan covers most
Conf. State Legs. Nov. 23, 2010)[ hereinafter SNELL, 2010 ENACTMENTS], available at  http://
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/employ/PensionReportNov23-2010.pdf; U.S. GOVERN-
MENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS:
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY (Mar. 2012).
103. See, e.g., RAJNES, supra note 38, at 1, 10.
104. See id. RONALD K. SNELL, STATE PENSION POLICY OPTIONS IN 2010 (Nat’l Conf. State
Legs. Mar. 2010); SNELL, 2011 ENACTMENTS, supra note 102, at 1 (“[I]n all, 41 states enacted
significant revisions to at least one state retirement plan in 2010 or 2011.”); RONALD K. SNELL,
PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT PLAN ENACTMENTS IN 2010 STATE LEGISLATURES (Nat’l Conf. State
Legs. Nov. 23, 2010) [hereinafter SNELL, 2010 ENACTMENTS]; SNELL, 2012 ENACTMENTS; U.S.
GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS: ECO-
NOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY (March 2012) (GAO-
12-322).
105. SNELL, 2011 ENACTMENTS, supra note 102, at 1–2. Recent legislation in a significant
number of states requires larger employee contributions from existing employees; in a few
states eligibility requirements have been revised for existing, non-vested employees and in
three states legislation calls for reduced cost of living adjustments when existing employees
retire, but only Rhode Island appears to have altered the retirement benefits committed to
be paid to current employees. Id.; Rhode Island Retirement Security Act, S1111A (Nov. 18,
2011) (effective July 1, 2012). See Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in
Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 263, 276–77, 279–80 (2011) (describing
proposed COLA adjustments impacting public employees in Colorado, Minnesota and South
Dakota). See also Gavin Reinke, Note, When a Promise Isn’t a Promise: Public Employers’ Ability to
Alter Pension Plans of Retired Employees, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1673, 1679–84 (2011); Whitney Cloud,
Comment, State Pension Deficits, the Recession, and a Modern View of the Contract Clause, 129 YALE
L.J. 2199, 2201–02 (2011). Illinois recently enacted legislation purporting to substantially
reduce the state’s public pensions deficit. Act of December 5, 2013, Ill. Pub. Act 98-599. The
legislation, however, contains several legally vulnerable reductions in the benefits of existing
and retired workers. Monique Garcia, Illinois Pension Reform Fight Shifting to the Courtroom, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 4, 2013, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-12-04/news/ct-met-illinois-pen-
sions-met-1205-20131205_1_pension-bill-illinois-supreme-court-retirement-system.
(Conveniently, the legislation insulates the state judiciary from its effects). See also Illinois:
Judge Halts Pension Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2014, at A17 (temporary stay) http://
nyti.ms/1sPSYvd. In any event, the financial impact of the pension reforms (according to the
sponsors, about a $20 billion reduction in the deficit if sustained in full) is less impressive in
terms of the state’s actual unfunded liabilities, estimated by Moody’s at $173 billion, as op-
posed to its reported shortfall of $100 billion. See Greg Hinz, Illinois Pension Liability Drops, a
Little, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS.,  Nov. 4, 2013 http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20131104/
BLOGS02/131109955/illinois-pension-liability-finally-drops-a-little#.
106. R. I. Ret. Sec. Act, S-1111A (Nov. 18, 2011) (eff. Jul. 1, 2012).
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Rhode Island state employees, included most existing employees.
Under the new scaled-back defined benefit plan, the formula multi-
plier is generally capped at one percent for service years after the
effective date.107 Until recently, the multiplier for some senior em-
ployees had been as high as three percent.108 The new legislation
extends the final average salary period from three years to five years
and increases age and service requirements. COLAs are also less
generous under the new regime.109
In Utah, new state employees are no longer eligible for a defined
benefit plan, as of July 1, 2011. They may choose a hybrid plan op-
tion or a defined contribution plan.110 The multiplier for the
defined benefit component is reduced from two percent to 1.5%,
and the final average salary will be calculated over the employee’s
final five years of service, rather than the last three.
Aside from Rhode Island and Utah, however, the most recent
wave of pension reforms has not targeted the defined benefit
model. Over the 2010–2011 period, fourteen states increased the
period over which terminal compensation is determined, normally
from three years to five years.111 Thirteen states increased the vest-
ing period, typically from five or six years to eight to ten years.112
Twenty-five states raised the age and years in service levels for retire-
ment eligibility.113 For example, in Missouri, the retirement age for
new employees has increased from age sixty-two with five years’
state employment to age sixty-seven with ten years’ state
employment.114
107. Id.
108. Id. (The balance of the employee and employer contributions will be allocated to a
defined contribution plan.) Contra WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, 2008 COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 29 (three percent multiplier for years.
21–34, two percent for >34).
109. In response to legal challenges, Rhode Island and public employees have tentatively
agreed to mitigate some aspects of the 2011 reforms. See, e.g., Jennifer Levitz & John Kamp,
Rhode Island Officials, Unions Agree on Pension Fix, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2014. See Outline of Terms
for Settlement Agreement at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1018533/ex-b.pdf.
110. New Public Employees’ Tier II Contributory Retirement Act, S.B. 63 (Utah 2010); see
also Munnell et al., supra note 98, at 5.
111. See SNELL, 2011 ENACTMENTS, supra note 102, at 2; SNELL, 2010 ENACTMENTS, supra
note 102, at 9–11, 16–-18. (Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, New Jersey, Virginia,
Michigan).
112. SNELL, 2011 ENACTMENTS, supra note 102, at 2.
113. Id.; SNELL, 2010 ENACTMENTS, supra note 102, at 9–20; NATIONAL CONF. ON PUB. EM-
PLOYEE RET. SYS. & COBALT COMMUNITY RESEARCH, 2011 PUBLIC FUND STUDY 17 (June 2011).
114. Or, alternatively, retirement eligibility begins at age fifty-five with age and service
summing to ninety, versus age forty-eight, with age and service summing eighty. See MISSOURI
STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, MISSOURI STATE EMPLOYEES’ PLAN: 2011 GENERAL EM-
PLOYEES’ RETIREMENT HANDBOOK 8 (2011).
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Quite a few states have recently revised their plans’ methods of
providing cost of living adjustments downward.115 For example, in
2011, legislation in New Jersey eliminated cost of living adjustments
for existing and future retirees while leaving open the possibility of
reinstatement should the funding status of the state’s plan im-
prove.116 The hybrid plan for new Michigan teachers does not
provide for a COLA.117 COLA reductions in Colorado, Minnesota,
and South Dakota—which affect existing and retired employees as
well as new hires—have attracted legal challenges.118 In each of
these cases, the level of future COLAs turns in part on the funding
level of the respective state’s pension plan.119 According to Boston
College CRR’s estimates, “A simple model suggests that eliminating
a 2-percent compounded COLA reduces [a representative em-
ployee’s] lifetime benefits by 15–17 percent . . . . Eliminating a 3-
percent COLA on the same initial benefit reduces lifetime benefits
by 22-25 percent.”120
II. DIFFICULTIES WITH CURRENT AND PROPOSED REFORMS
A. Vindicating Public Employee Rights Through Litigation
In the event that a public pension plan fails to satisfy its obliga-
tions to retired employees, the injured beneficiaries generally
would be able to pursue conventional state law remedies. A judg-
ment against a state or local government, however, is not a
negotiable instrument. If a private sector defendant does not volun-
tarily tender payment, a judgment generally would be enforced
115. See NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE PUBLIC EDUCATION PENSION PLANS
41-50 (2010). See also Ronald K. Snell, Pensions and Retirement Plans Enactments, in 2011 State
Legislatures, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures 2, 7–9 (2011); Ronald K. Snell, Pensions
and Retirement Plans Enactments, in 2010 State Legislatures, Nat’l Conference of State Legisla-
tures 7–9 (2010).
116. See NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF PENSIONS AND BENEFITS, COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS
(Feb. 2014), http://http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/pdf/factsheets/fact18.pdf.
117. See MICHIGAN HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, PUBLIC SCHOOL RETIRE-
MENT REVISIONS, A SUMMARY OF SENATE BILL 1227 AS ENACTED 2 (June 2010), http://www
.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2009-2010/billanalysis/House/pdf/2009-HLA-1227-7.pdf.
118. See, e.g., Reinke, supra note 105; Austin Applegate, Jormen Vallecillo, Katharine
Cheng, States’ Pensions: A Manageable Loner-Term Challenge 16–17, Barclay’s Capital (May
18, 2011), http://www.readbag.com/nasra-resources-barclays1105; Cloud, supra note 105, at
2200–02; Mary Williams Walsh, Two Rulings Find Cuts in Public Pensions Permissible, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2011, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/business/01/pension.html.
119. See SNELL, supra note 115, at 7–9.
120. Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry, Mark Cafarelli, Ctr. for Research at Bos. Coll.,
COLA Cuts in State/Local Pensions, 38 ST. & LOC. PENSION PLANS 1, 3 (2014), http://crr.bc
.edu/briefs/cola-cuts-in-statelocal-pensions.
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against the defendant’s property or by a garnishment of wages or
other funds.121 Yet these avenues are largely unavailable against a
government.122 In principle, a successful plaintiff, unable to fore-
close on public property, could instead seek to compel a defaulting
government—the government’s officials—to raise taxes to enforce
a judgment. Faced with a pension default, beneficiaries might fol-
low this strategy.
It would not be unprecedented for a court to compel a govern-
ment to raise taxes.123 Federal courts have ordered local
governments to raise property taxes in order to fund the costs of
school desegregation judgments.124 In the case of bond defaults,
however, attempting to compel tax increases has not proved to be a
particularly robust remedy in recent history.125 In any event, the re-
liability of raising state or local taxes to increase revenue is
uncertain in light of the ability of many residents to relocate. It is
hardly a foregone conclusion that pension defaults would be cured
121. See, e.g., Gentile v. Ives, 303 A.2d 720, 721 (Conn. 1972); United States v. Harkin
Builders, Inc., 45 F.3d 830, 833 (4th Cir. 1995). Prior to ERISA and the PBGC, these mecha-
nisms were often futile in the case of insolvent pension funds because the sponsors were
insolvent and had little in the way of income or assets. In the case of public pension plans,
the lack of income or assets will typically not be a problem, particularly when the sponsor is a
state government.
122. See Robert S. Amdursky & Clayton P. Gillette, Municipal Debt Finance Law § 5.4.3
(1992); Gentile, supra note 121, at 721; Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal
Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 648–50 (2010).
123. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U.S. 278, 302 (1882) (remanding to Supreme
Court of Louisiana to “direct the District Court to issue a mandamus to the city of New Orle-
ans and its authorities, annually to levy and collect the tax of $650,000.”); Bylinski v. City of
Allen Park, 8 F. Supp. 2d 965 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (“[W]hen a federal court determines that a
local municipality’s actions violate a federal [statute] . . . the court may order a local govern-
ment unit with taxing authority to levy taxes adequate to satisfy the municipality’s debt
obligations incurred in complying with federal law, even if the taxes exceed state constitu-
tional and statutory limitations.”).
124. E.g., Missouri v Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 52, 56–57 (1990) (“[A] local government with
taxing authority may be ordered to levy taxes in excess of the limit set by state statute where
there is reason based in the Constitution for not observing the statutory limitation.”); D.
Bruce La Pierre, Enforcement of Judgments Against States and Local Governments: Judicial Control
over the Power to Tax, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299 (1993).
125. CITY OF CLEVELAND, TEXAS, PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED NOVEMBER 13,
2012: COMBINATION TAX AND REVENUE CERTIFICATES OF OBLIGATION, SERIES 2012A 12 (“A reg-
istered owner’s only practical remedy, if a default occurs, is a mandamus or mandatory
injunction proceeding to compel the City to levy, assess and collect an annual ad valorem
tax . . . . However, the enforcement of such a remedy may be difficult and time consuming
and a registered owner could be required to enforce such a remedy on a periodic basis.”);
COUNTY OF PRINCE WILLIAM, VIRGINIA, PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 8,
2012: GENERAL OBLIGATION PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT BONDS, SERIES 2013 7 (“The mandamus
remedy, however, may be impracticable and difficult to enforce.”); see generally Kimhi, supra
note 122, at 647.
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by court-ordered taxation sufficient to eliminate pension fund defi-
cits.126 The outcome of litigation to fund pension plans by
compelling state or local governments to raise revenue, or reduce
spending, would be highly indeterminate. In the event of a pension
default, retired public employees would, at best, face lengthy delays
before receiving any satisfaction through existing legal remedies.
B. Drawbacks of Government Bankruptcy
Pension liabilities are not the sole source of financial exposure
for state and local governments.127 The Government Accountability
Office projects that the state and local government sector will find
it increasingly difficult to sustain the trend of its expenditures rela-
tive to projected revenues, largely on account of expected growth in
Medicaid and employee health care costs and lagging increases in
revenue.128 A Pew Center on the States’ study characterized Califor-
nia as on the “brink of insolvency” and classified Illinois, New
Jersey, and several other states as “in fiscal peril.”129 This situation
raises the possibility that some states, as well as some local govern-
ments, may be unable or unwilling to satisfy financial obligations
generally, and has led to proposals for federal legislation permitting
a state to declare bankruptcy.130 The current Bankruptcy Code au-
thorizes government bankruptcy only for certain subdivisions of a
126. See Clayton P. Gillette, What States Can Learn from Municipal Bankruptcy, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FIS-
CAL CRISIS 103 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012). While there may be many
residents who would find it difficult to move outside a municipality or state, such residents
may not be, on average, the most promising source of tax revenue.
127. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ FIS-
CAL OUTLOOK, GAO-12-523SP (Apr. 2012); NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE
FISCAL SURVEY OF THE STATES (2011); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, BEYOND CALIFORNIA: STATES IN
FISCAL PERIL (Nov. 11, 2009); STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET
CRISIS TASK FORCE 6 (July 2012) (“States have been grappling with their most serious finan-
cial crisis since the Great Depression.”).
128. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ FIS-
CAL OUTLOOK, GAO-12-523SP (Apr. 2012); see also NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,
THE FISCAL SURVEY OF THE STATES (2011).
129. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, BEYOND CALIFORNIA: STATES IN FISCAL PERIL 1, 2 (Nov. 11,
2009).
130. E.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., supra note 14, at 680, 735; Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist
Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA L. REV. 322, 331–35 (2011); Alan Fram, House GOP
Leader Says No Federal Bailout of States, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 24, 2011 (“Kate Dickens, spokes-
man for Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., said Kirk believes Congress should give states the power to
declare bankruptcy and avoid default and is talking to other lawmakers about potential legis-
lation.”). But see Sara Murray, Rep. McHenry: Idea of State Bankruptcy Is Off the Table, WALL ST. J.
BLOGS (Apr. 13, 2011: 2:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/04/13/rep-mchenry-
FALL 2014] A Public Pensions Bailout 211
state—generally referred to as municipal bankruptcy under Chap-
ter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code—but not for an entire state.131 This
subsection considers whether bankruptcy, in its current form or ex-
panded to include states, could be a viable solution to the problem
of underfunded public pensions.
1. Municipal Bankruptcy
The conventional wisdom has been that public employee pen-
sions are not restructured in bankruptcy, although several recent
filings have challenged that position.132 A municipal bankruptcy
is—and a prospective state bankruptcy would be—something of a
hybrid of consumer bankruptcy and a business reorganization. Mu-
nicipal bankruptcy is formally known as the “Adjustment of Debts
of a Municipality.”133 The Bankruptcy Code requires explicit state
government authorization for a local government to proceed as a
debtor in bankruptcy.134 In about half the states—including Geor-
gia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Virginia, and Wisconsin—
local governments lack this authorization.135 In a number of
other states, state law provides only limited authorization.136 A
idea-of-state-bankruptcy-is-off-the-table (“Republicans have dismissed the idea of pushing leg-
islation that would allow states to declare bankruptcy. ‘We got pretty strong consensus that
that was a bad idea,’ Mr. McHenry said.”).
131. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(13), 101(40), 101(41), 109(a) (2012).
132. See, e.g., Liz Farmer, The “B” Word: Is the Stigma of Municipal Bankruptcy Going Away?,
GOVERNING, Mar. 2013, http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-bword-stigma-muni
cipal-bankruptcy-going-away.html; Mary Williams Walsh, Creditors of Stockton Fight Over Pension
Funding While in Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2012, at B3, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/24/business/creditors-of-stockton-fight-city-over-pensions-while-in-bankruptcy.html
(“Creditors of the city of Stockton, Calif., are mounting a challenge against a popular belief:
that public workers’ pensions are impervious to cutbacks even when a city goes bankrupt.”).
133. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2012).
135. See W. Clark Watson et al., Municipal Bankruptcy: A Guide for Public Finance Attorneys,
NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND LAWYERS, Oct. 2011, http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/documents/
municipal_bankruptcy_a_guide_for_public_finance_attorneys.pdf; Alston & Bird, LLP, Mu-
nicipal Assets in Distress (MAD) Task Force, Options for Dealing with Municipal Assets in
Distress Aug. 2011, http://www.alston.com/files/docs/MAD-TaskForce.pdf [hereinafter Al-
ston & Bird]; Caitlin Devitt, Indiana Says No to Chapter 9, BOND BUYER, May 3, 2011, http://
www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_84/indiana_chapter_nine-1026181-1.html.
136. See Watson et al., supra note 135; Alston & Bird, supra note 135; see, e.g., R.I. Gen
Laws § 45-9-7 (vesting authority in state-appointed receiver); Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565
(R.I. 2011); Michigan Compiled Laws § 141.1222 (2007) (conditional on appointment and
consent of emergency financial manager); In re Slocum Co. Drainage District, 336 BR 387
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (authorization conditional on recommendation of Illinois financial
planning and supervision commission or financial advisor). See also Chapman & Cutler, LLP,
Chapter 9: The Last Resort for Financially Distressed Municipalities, in Primer on Municipal
Debt Adjustment, at App. D (2012), http://www.afgi.org/resources/Bankruptcy_Primer.pdf.
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municipality must be insolvent to be eligible for bankruptcy;137 the
definition of insolvency for municipal bankruptcy purposes is that
the government is “(i) generally not paying its debts as they become
due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (ii)
unable to pay its debts once they become due.”138
A garden variety municipal bankruptcy involves a toll road au-
thority, a water district, or a similar special-purpose district that may
have borrowed substantial sums for a capital project, intending to
service the debt through user fees or assessments that failed to raise
as much money as expected.139 In these cases, the principal credi-
tors are usually bondholders who agree to a haircut,140 presumably
in consideration for placing the debtor in a position to focus on
generating a reliable revenue stream to at least partially satisfy its
creditors. This is similar to a reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code, since the local government’s assets cannot
be liquidated. Keeping a business operating is often a goal of a reor-
ganization, although that is not guaranteed. (Unlike in Chapter 9, a
business reorganization can be converted to a liquidation.) There-
fore, the debtor in Chapter 9 or Chapter 11 typically seeks to
reduce its debts to a manageable level going forward, eliminating
most or all other claims through the power of the bankruptcy court
to discharge debts.141 The debtor proposes a plan specifying the ex-
tent to which it will honor, impair, or modify particular obligations.
Under Chapter 9 or Chapter 11, a successful plan does not have
to obtain unanimous consent from creditors.142 In the typical case,
however, obtaining the approval of a bankruptcy court will require
support from most creditors. Most creditors might support a plan,
even though it reduces the nominal value of their claims, if they
would not expect to do better otherwise. A plan of reorganization
under Chapter 11, or a plan of adjustment under Chapter 9, will
specify classes of creditor claims, and generally each class must then
vote to approve the plan.143 Although a successful plan does not
137. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012).
138. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2012).
139. E.g., In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, Inc., 447 BR 752 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2011); In re City of
Colorado Springs Spring Creek Gen. Imp. Dist., 187 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1995); In re
Lake Grady Rd. & Bridge Dist., 119 B.R. 844 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (special tax district).
140. E.g., In re Connector 2000 Ass’n, Inc., First Amended Plan for Adjustment of Debts
(Bankr. D. S.C. 2011), available at http://www.southernconnector.com/Zbankruptcy.htm. See
Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON
REG. 359, 359 n.44 (2010).
141. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(c)-(d), 944(b)(2) (2012).
142. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 1129(a)(3)-(4), 901(7)-(10) (2012).
143. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (2012). The approval of a class whose claims are not
discounted by the plan is not required. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(B).
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require the approval of each class, the requirements for obtaining a
bankruptcy court’s approval of a plan favor obtaining assent from
its major creditors.144 So unless pension plan beneficiaries are on
board, a local government will have difficulty adjusting its pension
obligations through bankruptcy.
Severe levels of municipal financial distress have increased the
pressure to obtain concessions from government pension plans
through bankruptcy. To date, however, municipal bankruptcy has
not yet proved a reliable means of obtaining relief from employee
pension obligations. There seems to be only one instance of a mu-
nicipality reducing pension obligation through bankruptcy.
Recently, a bankruptcy court approved a plan that contained signif-
icant reductions to the benefits of retired employees of Central
Falls, Rhode Island.145 In that case, retirees apparently acquiesced
to the plan in light of state legislation that might have reduced their
priority in bankruptcy and Rhode Island’s agreement to supple-
ment the funds available to pay their benefits.146 In other states,
municipal pension beneficiaries would have less incentive to accept
reductions in their benefits in bankruptcy.147 For example, the Cali-
fornia Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) maintains
that under California law, obligations to retirees have priority over
most other debts in municipal bankruptcy.148 Whether or not the
CalPERS’ position is vindicated, it makes it unlikely consent will be
144. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity’s Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 125, 130
(1990); DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 231 (5th ed. 2010); Richard F. Broude,
Cramdown and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 29 BUS. L. 441, 441,
453–54 (1984). The possibility of a plan without general creditor approval can serve as a
significant motivation to gaining creditors’ acceptance. Daniel J. Bussel & Kenneth N. Klee,
Recalibrating Consent in Bankruptcy, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 663 (2009); Schwarcz, supra note 130, at
335 n.74 (“There does not appear to be any precedent in which municipalities resorted to
cramdown under Chapter 9, nor are commentators in agreement on how such a cramdown
would be applied.”).
145. See Jess Bidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, at A21, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/us/central-falls-ri-to-
emerge-from-bankruptcy.html; Farmer, supra note 132; Nancy Kaffer & Stephen Henderson,
Police, Fire Pension Costs Could Crush Detroit, Study Shows, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 26, 2013, at
1, http://www.freep.com/article/20130226/OPINION02/302260136/How-pension-costs-
could-crush-Detroit.
146. See Bankruptcy in Rhode Island: Improvident: Desperate Measures for Desperate Times, ECON-
OMIST, May 5, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21554232.
147. See, e.g., Kaffer & Henderson, supra note 145, at 1 (contrasting status of pension
obligations in bankruptcy in Michigan and Rhode Island).
148. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Cuts for the Already Retired, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2011, at
B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/business/pension-deal-in-rhode-isl+E95and-
could-set-a-trend.html?pagewanted=all; Steven Church & James Nash, Calpers Bankruptcy Strat-
egy Pits Retirees vs. All Others, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 12, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-12-12/calpers-bankruptcy-strategy-pits-retirees-vs-all-others.html.
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given anytime soon to a plan that reduces a California municipal-
ity’s pension obligations.
When Stockton, California sought bankruptcy protection, the
city did not propose to restructure its pension obligations. The
city’s other creditors, however, have objected to the city’s position,
and the outcome remains unsettled.149 In contrast, the emergency
manager of Detroit, Michigan has indicated that the city will seek to
reduce its pension obligations through bankruptcy.150 Here too, the
outcome remains in doubt. Soon after Detroit filed its bankruptcy
petition, several retired city workers and two of the city’s retirement
systems challenged the legality of the filing in state court under the
Michigan Constitution.151 That particular challenge, which has
been transferred to the federal bankruptcy court,152 is only the first
of several lines of resistance by the retirement systems and their
beneficiaries that Detroit must overcome. The city’s success in ad-
dressing pension deficits through bankruptcy is neither inevitable
nor predictable at this point.153
If either Detroit or Stockton eventually manages to lighten its
pension burden via municipal bankruptcy, other municipalities—
but only those in states that permit municipal bankruptcy—are
likely to attempt to do the same. There is no guarantee of that the
imitators will be successful. As discussed in Part II.B.2, below, out-
comes in bankruptcy are inherently difficult to forecast. Further, a
municipality’s success would be at the expense of public employees,
including retired workers on modest fixed incomes. Even if some
bankruptcy courts can be persuaded that giving retirees a haircut is
an appropriate result, such a solution may not become accepted as
149. In re City of Stockton, Cal., Opinion Regarding Chapter Nine Order of Relief
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013), at 14, 22, available at http://www.stocktongov.com/files/
6_12_2013_Chapter9_OpinionJudgeChristopherKleinOpionChapter9Relief.pdf; see also Dale
Kasler, Stockton Bankruptcy Trial Yields No Hint on Cutting CalPERS Payments, SACRAMENTO BEE,
June 4, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/2014/06/04/6458016/lawyer-defends-stocktons-deci-
sion.html (“Arguments in the Stockton bankruptcy trial wrapped up Wednesday without an
inkling from a judge on whether the city’s flow of pension money to CalPERS can be cur-
tailed to satisfy the demands of another creditor.”; cf. Chris Megerian et al., Stockton
Bankruptcy Ruling Could Deal Blow to CalPERS, Public Pensions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2014, http://
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-stockton-bankruptcy-ruling-20141001-story.html.
150. See CITY OF DETROIT, PROPOSAL FOR CREDITORS 56 (June 14, 2013), available at http:/
/www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4206913614.pdf.
151. E.g., Webster v. Michigan, No. 13-734-CZ (Cir. Ct., Ingham Co., July 19, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.freep.com/assets/freep/pdf/C4208749719.pdf.
152. See Bill Vlasic, Federal Judge Halts Legal Challenges in Detroit Bankruptcy Case, N.Y. TIMES
(July 25, 2013), at A14, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/us/judge-clears-path-for-de-
troit-bankruptcy-case.html.
153. Cf. Mary Williams Walsh, Detroit Rolls Out New Model: A Hybrid Pension Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2014, at A1, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/detroit-rolls-out-
new-model-a-hybrid-pension-plan/?smid=pl-share.
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an attractive public policy as the consequences to beneficiaries be-
come evident.
2. State Bankruptcy
In view of the considerable number of states facing financial
stress, David Skeel proposes that eligibility for bankruptcy be ex-
tended to state governments. Skeel claims that through bankruptcy
a “governor and his state could immediately chop the fat out of its
contracts with unionized public employees.”154 In addition, the
bankruptcy process would allow a state to “reduce its bond debt,
which is nearly impossible to restructure outside of bankruptcy.”155
Skeel also asserts that state bankruptcy “could even permit a re-
structuring of the Cadillac pension benefits that states have
promised to public employees.”156
Skeel maintains that “[t]he ability to restructure [public em-
ployee] contracts is an essential component of an effective state
bankruptcy framework.” According to Skeel,
In the current crisis . . . unsustainably generous public em-
ployee contracts have been a major component of most
troubled states’ woes. Lawmakers have considerable incentives
to award generous contracts to state employees, both because
state employees are an important voting block and because
lawmakers themselves may be direct or indirect beneficiaries
of the contracts.157
Skeel contends that state bankruptcy is preferable to direct federal
financial support of struggling states. He recognizes that the federal
government is the most likely source of funds for states declaring
bankruptcy, but maintains that “the prospect of a bankruptcy re-
structuring would significantly reduce amount of funding needed
as compared to a pure bailout.”158
Under Skeel’s scheme, a state’s bankruptcy filing would initiate
negotiations between the government and its creditors—bondhold-
ers, vendors, retired public employees entitled to benefits, etc.—to
154. David Skeel, A Bankruptcy Law—Not Bailouts—for the States, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 2011,
at A17.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. David A. Skeel, Jr., State Bankruptcy from the Ground Up, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE:
THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 198 (Peter
Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012).
158. Id. at 211.
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establish an agreement on restructuring the state’s obligations. He
expects that an agreement, in addition to imposing losses on bond-
holders, would include significant wage and benefits reductions,159
apparently a rare occurrence in a municipal bankruptcy.
Although some immediate manifestations of a public pension cri-
sis have appeared on the local level, municipal bankruptcy could
play at most a supporting role in addressing the problem of un-
derfunded public plans. Many local governments are not
authorized under state law to file under Chapter 9, and the greater
share of unfunded public pension liabilities belongs to state plans.
If the concept of state bankruptcy can overcome some formidable
political resistance,160 it could conceivably play a major role in con-
fronting the problem across the country. As a solution to potential
public pension plan defaults over the next decade, however, state
bankruptcy would have several potential drawbacks:
• It may not be possible to determine a satisfactory plan.
• Outcomes would be unpredictable and could be inconsis-
tent across jurisdictions.
• Bankruptcy courts lack the expertise to assess the sus-
tainability of restructured pension plans.
• Public employees could be left with inadequate resources
for retirement.
Most of the benefits that Skeel identifies from allowing states to
restructure their debts in bankruptcy would come from altering
states’ behavior outside of bankruptcy: giving financially troubled
states more leverage in negotiations with public employee unions
and bondholders; and making it more difficult for states to defer
funding employee pensions, to borrow irresponsibly, or to commit
to unsustainable employee benefits. While these may be worthwhile
objectives, the asserted benefits will do little to address the problem
of already severely underfunded public pension plans. Given the
precarious financial condition of a number of public pension plans,
state bankruptcy cannot be counted on to simply discourage public
pension plan defaults; it must be able to administer them reliably if
a bankruptcy occurs.
159. Id. at 209.
160. See e.g., Nat’l Governors Ass’n, NGA Statement Regarding Bankruptcy Proposals for
States (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.nga.org/cms/home/news-room/news-releases/
page_2011/col2-content/main-content-list/nga-statement-regarding-bankrupt.html (“The
mere existence of a law allowing states to declare bankruptcy only serves to increase interest
rates, raise the costs of state government and create more volatility in financial markets.”).
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In an actual state bankruptcy, liquidation of the state would be
off the table. In a business bankruptcy, creditors are motivated to
devise a plan that dominates their returns from liquidating the
debtor. Without a liquidation option, the prospects for creditor
consensus on a plan to adjust the government’s debts are
uncertain.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize that, by the nature of
bankruptcy, it is impossible to say with any confidence what implica-
tions state bankruptcy might have for a public pension plan crisis.
Bankruptcy law is indeterminate and unpredictable in practice.161
Therefore, significant inconsistencies in the treatment of pension
plan beneficiaries are probably inevitable in different bankruptcy
proceedings. If such inconsistencies do arise, they may not be rec-
ognized as having any appealing substantive policy rationales. They
may also be politically awkward, creating pressure for a federal fi-
nancial remedy outside of bankruptcy.
It is possible that, had state bankruptcy been an option over the
past fifty years, public pensions would not be at risk today. Yet it is
difficult to see how state bankruptcy would prevent the prospect of
punishing losses to existing and retired public employees with re-
spect to their retirement benefits. Given the inherent actuarial
complexities of public pension plans, it also seems questionable
that a bankruptcy court would be the appropriate forum for ensur-
ing that a pension plan would remain on sound financial footing in
the decades after its sponsor government emerged from
bankruptcy.
Conceivably, over the long haul, the incentives from allowing
state bankruptcy would encourage state governments to operate
more efficiently. In the short run, however, state bankruptcy would
not reduce the costs associated with public pension plan deficits. As
opposed to a federal bailout, state bankruptcy would presumably
lead to a different allocation of losses, but owing to the unpredict-
ability of the bankruptcy process, it very unclear what that
allocation would be.
161. See, e.g., Special Report of the Tribar Opinion Committee, Opinions in the Bankruptcy
Context: Rating Agency, Structured Financing, and Chapter 11 Transactions, 46 BUS. L. 717, App. 8-
26 (1991) (“[O]pinions to nonclient third parties on bankruptcy law matters unavoidably
have inherent limitations . . . . [that] exist primarily because of: the pervasive equity powers
of bankruptcy courts; the overriding goal of reorganization to which other legal rights and
policies may be subordinated; the potential relevance to the exercise of judicial discretion of
future arising facts and circumstances; and the nature of the bankruptcy process.”).
218 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:1
C. Subsidizing Borrowing
Joshua Rauh and Robert Novy-Marx suggest that the federal gov-
ernment address the problem of severely underfunded public
pension plans by offering to subsidize state and local government
debt that is dedicated to funding public pensions. In return for the
subsidy, the government sponsor would have to stop offering de-
fined benefit pension plans to new public employees.162 Rauh and
Novy-Marx, however, do not propose that the federal government
guarantee such debt, nor do they consider whether jurisdictions
with the most severely underfunded plans have the capacity to ob-
tain and service enough debt to keep their pension plans afloat
without federal guarantees. There is no reason to think that Rauh
and Novy-Marx’s proposal would require smaller contributions
from the federal government if it were to provide the same level of
security to beneficiaries of public plans.
In addition, Rauh and Novy-Marx’s proposal would not ade-
quately address the underfunded status of existing public pensions.
Besides requiring the phaseout of defined benefit plans, they would
mandate that states move toward full funding of their existing pub-
lic plans: “The state must annually make exactly its actuarially
required contribution (ARC) left over from the existing un-
derfunded plans.”163 The ARC (Actuarially Required Contribution
or Annual Required Contribution of a public pension plan) is a
GASB concept consisting of two components: normal cost and an
amortization contribution.164 Normal cost represents the expense of
benefits attributable to the service of employees during the current
year, determined under the funding method used by the plan.165
The amortization contribution is a partial payment against any un-
funded liabilities attributable to employee services in past years,
where the extent to which the plan is considered underfunded is
determined according to the funding method chosen by the plan
and the amortization of unfunded liabilities could generally extend
over not more than thirty years.
162. “The state must close its defined benefit plans to new employees under a ‘soft freeze’
and agree not to start any new defined benefit plans for at least 30 years.” Joshua Rauh &
Robert Novy-Marx, Pension Security Bonds: A New Plan to Address the State Pension Crisis, (2010),
available at http://kelloggfinance.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/plan-20100517-final-5pm1
.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Governmental Accounting Standards Board, Statement 27: Accounting for Pensions
by State and Local Government Employers (1994).
165. Charles L. Trowbridge, Fundamentals of Pension Funding, 4 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES 17, 21 (1952), http://www.soa.org/library/research/transactions-of-soci
ety-of-actuaries/1949-59/1952/january/tsa52v4n83.aspx.
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A public pension plan’s choice of a funding method has been
constrained by GASB standards.166 As noted in Part II.B.1, however,
GASB voluntary funding standards are significantly less demanding
than the ERISA standards for private plans. So, in effect, Rauh and
Novy-Marx’s proposal would rely on GASB’s less rigorous standards
for determining whether a plan complies with their proposed fund-
ing mandate. In any event, effective June 15, 2014, GASB standards
no longer include the ARC, which Rauh and Novy-Marx propose
the federal government rely on to assess the adequacy of public
plan’s annual contributions.167 GASB has actually retreated from its
role in requiring plans to report the adequacy of their annual fund-
ing,168 highlighting the need for significantly greater federal
involvement than Rauh and Novy-Marx contemplate. In sum, Rauh
and Novy-Marx do not consider whether their proposal is likely to
be sufficient to address the underfunding of public pension funds
or to cost less than any other approach, and their proposal would
assess public plans’ progress in moving toward full funding based
on an unsatisfactory and now obsolete GASB standard.
Moreover, there are both political and constitutional difficulties
with Rauh and Novy-Marx’s proposed requirement that public
plans cease offering defined benefit plans to new employees. A po-
litical drawback is that the federal government continues to allow
private sector plans to offer defined benefits pensions and to guar-
antee the benefits of their beneficiaries. Rauh and Novy-Marx do
not explain why defined benefit plans are acceptable in the private
sector but not in the public sector.169 Additionally, as discussed in
Part III.C, the Supreme Court has been suspicious of federal regula-
tion of States’ affairs that is more restrictive than federal regulation
of private sector affairs.
166. Pension Funding: A Guide for Elected Officials, National Governors Association et al. 3
(2013), http://www.nasra.org/files/JointPublications/PensionFundingGuide.pdf.
167. Rauh & Novy-Marx, Pension Security Bonds, supra note 162, at 2.
168. Munnell et al., supra note 74, at 6, http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/
07/slp_32.pdf; GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, PENSION ACCOUNTING AND FI-
NANCIAL REPORTING FOR PENSIONS: AN AMENDMENT OF GASB STATEMENT NO. 27 98 (2012)
(“[GASB] does not believe that it would be appropriate to require disclosures about a stan-
dardized measure of the amount an employer would need to contribute to a pension plan
each year . . . in order to reach projected objectives.”).
169. ERISA has been cited as a factor in the decline in defined benefit pensions in the
private sector. See, e.g., Zelinsky, supra note 23, at 469–82, 504–06. Imposing funding rules
and insurance premiums on defined benefit public plans may move the public sector in the
same direction.
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III. FEDERAL STABILIZATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR PENSION PLANS
A. Reform: A Voluntary Federal Program Modeled On ERISA
1. General Principles
It is not certain that the federal government will step in to aid the
retired teachers, police officers, and firefighters who are benefi-
ciaries of failing public pension plans. Nevertheless, it is sensible to
prepare for that possibility. Timely action would allow the federal
government to control the crisis and limit its ultimate financial ex-
posure. As an intermediate step, the federal government should
establish a mechanism to identify public pension plans at risk of
insolvency and regularly monitor the state of their finances using
ERISA’s more rigorous actuarial standards.
No magic bullet exists that will eliminate the existing deficits of
distressed public pension plans. A properly structured federal pro-
gram, however, could both motivate and empower public pension
plan sponsors to prevent further erosion in the financial condition
of their plans. Failure to act promptly risks a much larger crisis
down the road, and a larger, more widespread crisis will only inten-
sify the pressure for federal action, at a greater cost. Assuming that
the federal government will recognize that intervention is at least
the lesser of evils, this Section describes a federal program that con-
ditions federal financial support on acceptance of federal
supervision.
A federal bailout of public pension plans might discourage state
and local governments from adequately funding their plans, induce
them to offer more generous benefits, and generally move the con-
dition of public pension plan finances from bad to worse. So an
essential prerequisite for federal financial support of a distressed
public pension plan is the acceptance of federal oversight. Further,
federal oversight must discourage actions that might lead to deteri-
oration in a plan’s financial condition. Accordingly, in order for
any public pension plan in a state to receive federal support, the
state should be required to affirmatively accept federal supervision
of all of the state’s government retirement plans, at both the state
and local levels. States could opt out of federal regulation, but then
no public pension plan in the state would be eligible for federal
financial support. The federal oversight of public pension plans
should be at least as rigorous as federal regulation of private sector
retirement plans under ERISA. In particular:
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• Plans must fully fund benefits accruing from the start of the
federal program and move toward full funding for their leg-
acy liabilities.170
• Plans must use actuarial standards comparable to the ones
mandated for private plans, employing risk-free or low-risk
discount rates in determining plan liabilities.171
• Plans would be charged insurance premiums172 based on the
riskiness of a plan’s investment portfolio.
• Plans would be required to provide regular reports on their
financial status.173
As discussed more fully in Part III.B, mandatory full funding is the
key component of federal financial support for public pensions. In
itself, however, a funding requirement will not protect the federal
treasury unless the determination of a plan’s financial status is regu-
lated and takes into account the riskiness of plan assets.
The determination of the financial condition of a defined bene-
fit pension plan depends on complex actuarial analysis. The results
can vary substantially according to the method of projecting plan
investment returns and the discount rate applied to plan liabilities.
In order to prevent pension plan sponsors from choosing actuarial
methods and parameters opportunistically to disguise financial dif-
ficulties, ERISA specifies the actuarial methods, mortality tables,
and discount rates used to determine a private pension plan’s fi-
nancial condition.174 In contrast, GASB accounting guidelines for
public plans provide much more flexibility in the selection of actua-
rial assumptions.175
In the calculation of a private sector plan’s liabilities, the Trea-
sury chooses the discount rate according to current interest rates
on investment grade corporate bonds.176 Guidelines applicable to
public pension plans sanction the use of “the long-term expected
rate of return on pension plan investments.”177 As noted in Part
170. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 430 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1083 (2012).
171. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 430 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 1083(h) (2012).
172. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1306-07 (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 1083(h) (2012).
173. Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (2012). See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FORM 5500 ANNUAL RE-
TURN/REPORT OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/5500main.html.
174. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FIS-
CAL YEAR 2007 REVENUE PROPOSALS 76–80 (2006) http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2007.pdf; 26 U.S.C. § 430 (2006).
175. U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 48; MOODY’S INVESTOR SER-
VICE, supra note 75.
176. 26 U.S.C. § 430(h)(2) (2006).
177. See Brown & Wilcox, supra note 83, at 539; Governmental Accounting Standards
Board, supra note 164.
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I.B.3, this typically results in public plans using a rate in the neigh-
borhood of eight percent.178 The discount rate mandated for
private plans depends on the duration of the plan’s obligations and
the prevailing yield curve, recently ranging from two percent, short
term, to 6.5%, long term (that is, beyond twenty years).179 A private
pension plan with benefit commitments of $100 million concen-
trated twenty years out would have liabilities of about $35 million
under ERISA standards while a public plan with similar obligations
would likely report liabilities of only around $21 million. While re-
cent revisions to GASB standards may represent a slight
improvement in reporting standards for public plans, federal regu-
lation of public plans should require them to apply actuarial
assumptions at least as strict as those stipulated for private plans.
Significantly, underfunded public pension plans cannot be ex-
pected to move toward full funding over the next few years. If they
could be fully funded in short order, then either they would have
no need for federal support or they would have little incentive to
accept federal regulation in exchange for federal aid. Initially, ER-
ISA allowed sponsors of private sector defined benefit plans up to
forty years to eliminate their deficits.180 Under current law, un-
derfunded private plans are generally allowed only seven years to
do so.181 Therefore, while government sponsors should be required
to fully fund obligations arising from the period following the estab-
lishment of the federal program, they should be allowed to
eliminate their unfunded liabilities over a span of several years.
178. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 29, at 3–4.
179. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PART III—ADMINISTRATIVE, MISCELLANEOUS, AND PROCEDU-
RAL: UPDATE FOR THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE INTEREST RATES, YIELD CURVES, AND SEGMENT RATES,
Notice 2011-49, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-49.pdf, The Moving Ahead for Pro-
gress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21), Pub. L. No. 112-141, enacted July 6, 2012, 126 Stat.
405, § 40211, temporarily raised discount rates used to determine plan funding status, based
on a twenty-five-year moving average of corporate bond rates, rather than current bond rates.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PART III—ADMINISTRATIVE, MISCELLANEOUS, AND PROCEDURAL:
UPDATE FOR THE WEIGHTED AVERAGE INTEREST RATES, YIELD CURVES, AND SEGMENT RATES, No-
tice 2013-46, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-13-46.pdf/n-13-46.pdf. The effect of MAP-
21 was to temporarily permit private plans to reduce their contributions to their pension
plans, and, because contributions are deductible, the likelihood of reduced contributions
and higher reported income permitted the legislation to be scored as raising federal reve-
nue. The underlying policy of MAP-21 has been strongly criticized by the Pension Task Force
of the American Academy of Actuaries and the Society of Actuaries as “materially distort[ing]
pension plan measurement” and undermining the financial soundness of the PBGC. Gordon
J. Latter, Chairperson of the Pension Finance Task Force, Re: Pension Funding Provisions of
Recent Legislative Proposals (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.actuary.org/files/PFTF_Ltr_MAP-
21-Extension_April-17-2014.pdf. The procedure for determining private plan discount rates
prior to MAP-21 is the appropriate model for public pension regulation.
180. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 302, 88
Stat. 869–70 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 1082(a) (2012)).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 1083(c) (2012).
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Some severely underfunded public pensions may never be able to
catch up, of course, and a portion of these will become insolvent,
just as in the private sector.182
The reference date for full funding must be no later than the
date on which this Article’s proposed federal stabilization program
is established, rather than, for example, the date a public pension
plan applies for federal assistance. Otherwise, a government spon-
sor would lack an incentive to begin addressing a plan’s
underfunding until it was forced to seek financial assistance. In fact,
the reference date for full funding might be set somewhat before
the date that legislation is enacted: perhaps the date on which ena-
bling legislation is introduced.
2. A Government Pension Benefit Guaranty Agency
If the federal government does step in to address the problem of
distressed public pension plans, an operation resembling the PBGC
will be necessary when an underfunded public pension plan does
run out of money. The proposed entity might be called the Govern-
ment Pension Benefit Guaranty Agency (GPBGA). While the PBGC
so far has been able to operate without drawing on the general
funds of the federal government by charging insurance premiums
to private plans, the GPBGA would likely require substantial infu-
sions of federal money immediately. In light of the financial
difficulties PBGC has experienced, it seems advisable to establish a
new entity to support and supervise public plans. If the federal gov-
ernment guarantees public pension plan obligations, it is essential
that the insurance premiums take into account the riskiness of a
plan’s investment portfolio, something that the existing private sec-
tor pension guarantee program fails to do.183
182. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., PBGC to Assume Responsibility for Pension Benefits
at Butzel Long, July 3, 2013. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, during fiscal year
2014, the PBCG will administer over 4500 plans that it has taken over from sponsors, paying
almost 900,000 retires about $6 billion in benefits in aggregate. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FISCAL
YEAR 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTEE CORPORATION
13 (2013), http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2014/PDF/CBJ-2014-V2-02.pdf.
183. See Jeffrey R. Brown, Guaranteed Trouble: The Economic Effects of the Pension Benefit Guar-
anty Corporation, 22 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 177, 179, 179 n.3 (2008) http://pubs.aeaweb.org/
doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.22.1.177; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2013
BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 31 (Feb. 2012) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/budget.pdf.
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Under ERISA, the PBGC is authorized to terminate a private
pension plan at the request of the plan administrator if, for exam-
ple, the sponsor is bankrupt or insolvent.184 The PBGC may initiate
a plan termination if the plan cannot pay current benefits, if the
agency determines that failure to terminate the plan threatens to
“unreasonably” expose the PBGC trust fund to greater losses, or if
the plan has not met the minimum ERISA funding standards.185
When a plan is terminated, the PBGC obtains the plan’s assets,186
assumes responsibility for paying benefits to the terminated plan’s
beneficiaries,187 and attempts to recover the plan’s shortfall from
the employer that sponsored the plan.188
Like the PBGC, the GPBGA should be given the authority to ter-
minate distressed public pension plans under its jurisdiction. In
most cases, neither bankruptcy nor insolvency of the employer
would provoke termination, although for a few local jurisdictions
municipal bankruptcy is conceivable.189 Termination would be an
option when a public plan has, or is close to having, insufficient
funds to pay current benefits. Upon termination, the GPBGA would
assume responsibility for paying the plan’s beneficiaries and could
obtain a claim on the government sponsor for the plan’s unfunded
liabilities. At the outset, at least, the federal government seems un-
likely to foreclose the possibility of having state and local
governments repay these funds. It is reasonable to suppose that the
duration of any such debts would be measured in decades, whether
or not a framework similar to that proposed in this Article is
adopted.
The impetus for ERISA, which imposes extensive regulation on
private pension plans and guarantees their benefits, came from a
record of significant private pension plan defaults.190 That sort of
184. 29 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2012).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2012).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (2012).
188. See, e.g., Pension Benefits Guar. Corp. v. Beverley, 404 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005).
189. Under current law, bankruptcy is unlikely to play a significant role in resolving the
problems of underfunded public pensions. States are not eligible for bankruptcy; recent pro-
posals to change this, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., supra note 14, at 680, 735, seem to have lost
momentum. See Sara Murray, supra note 130. In about half the states, including, for example,
Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oregon, Virginia and Wisconsin, local governments are not
authorized to file for municipal bankruptcy. In a number of other states, state law provides
only limited authorization. See W. Clark Watson et al., supra note 135. The conventional wis-
dom has been that public employee pensions are not restructured in bankruptcy, although
that position has been challenged recently. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, supra note 132. See
also § II.B.
190. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A
POLITICAL HISTORy 79 (2004).
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precedent is absent in the case of public pensions. The evidence
described in Part I.B.3, however, suggests that it is time to prepare
for a greater federal role with respect to state and local government
employee pension plans. Presumably, the underfunding of numer-
ous state and local pension plans will become an unavoidable item
on the public policy agenda around the time that at least one sizea-
ble plan no longer has sufficient assets to pay even the current
benefits to retired beneficiaries and their survivors. The first time
that occurs—if it does happen—it is possible that, through a combi-
nation of tax increases and expenditure cuts, the sponsoring
jurisdiction will be able to raise sufficient funds to forestall a de-
fault. Yet the affected jurisdiction may face the same challenge each
year, indefinitely, and conceivably it will not be politically feasible
to meet that challenge indefinitely. Since many jurisdictions may be
on the brink of similar adversity, it seems foreseeable that, at some
point, sizeable defaults will occur absent federal intervention. While
this hypothetical scenario suggests a possible role for the federal
government in guaranteeing state and local employee pensions, it
does not suggest that the most favorable form of intervention is to
wait until such a crisis is at hand.
3. Treatment of Current Public Employees
A striking difference between private and public pension plans is
that only in the case of many public plans are the terms of an em-
ployee’s pension largely locked in from the date of hire. This makes
it more difficult to align a public pension plan’s benefit commit-
ments with fiscal realities. In many states, public plans facing
imminent financial distress are only able to adjust the benefits of
new hires, although these employees will not make demands on the
plan’s cash flow for decades to come. In some cases, state courts
have noted that rules barring impairments of the terms of existing
employees’ pensions might be qualified in the case of fiscal emer-
gencies,191 but this may require a state to wait until it is on the brink
of a crisis before it can consider essential reforms to its public em-
ployee retirement plans.
Under its Spending Clause authority, Congress could permit
public plans in participating states to revise the benefits of existing
employees to the same extent that private plans may do so under
ERISA. Such a revision would have no direct effect on the benefits
191. See, e.g., Hammond v. Hoffbeck, 627 P.2d 1052, 1058 n.11 (Alaska 1981); Opinion of
the Justices to the House of Representatives, 303 N.E.2d 320, 329 (Mass. 1973).
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of already retired public employees or on the accrued benefits of
existing workers. But it would allow, for example, a state or local
government to substitute defined contribution plans for defined
benefit plans for all its employees with respect to future services.
This option would permit the federal government to reduce its
level of oversight over the state or local government’s retirement
programs. Private employers have always had the option to make
these kinds of changes to employee pensions, and there do not ap-
pear to be compelling economic or public policy arguments against
allowing public employers to do so. As Amy Monahan observed,
“How can individuals have a reasonable expectation of future bene-
fit accruals if they cannot have a reasonable expectation regarding
the factors that determine the amount of that benefit, such as salary
level and length of employment?”192 In other words, it does not
seem credible to maintain that, at the time an employee is first
hired, the employee could have relied on receiving a particular
level of pension accruals for, say, the employee’s tenth year of em-
ployment. A government employee generally has no basis to
assume, at the time of hiring, that he will continue to be employed
by the government in ten years or that he will receive a particular
salary.
It is a somewhat different question whether federal law should
(1) permit public plans in participating states to alter the future
benefit accruals of public employees of long tenure or (2) simply
permit (or perhaps require) the plans to, in the future, cease treat-
ing the benefit plans of their new hires as locked in for the
remainder of the those employees’ careers in public service. While
the second option might seem more palatable in the abstract, it
would probably prove to be a much less effective means of moving
severely underfunded plans towards solvency. As a result, under the
second alternative, some retired public employees might not re-
ceive their full benefits. In that case, the first option, while not
ideal, may appear more attractive.
The first option may cause some current employees to receive
less generous pensions than expected because their future service
yields less generous retirement benefits, although conceivably
higher future pay could compensate for reduced pension benefit
accruals. The second option, however, may result in more plans be-
coming insolvent. That is likely to result in reduced benefits for
some retired workers, and perhaps current workers, even if their
192. Monahan, supra note 53, at 641; see also Amy B. Monahan, Statutes as Contracts?: The
“California Rule” and Its Impact on Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1078–79 (2012).
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benefits are federally guaranteed, if the program follows the ERISA
model of insuring benefits only up to a fixed amount.193
4. Additional Considerations
A formal commitment of federal support in advance of actual
public pension plan defaults might discourage public pension plans
from putting their houses in order to the extent that they are able.
By acting before defaults occur, however, the federal government
can impose fiscal discipline and bring transparency to the financial
status of public plans, thus obliging the plans’ government sponsors
to prevent any further deterioration in their plans’ financial condi-
tions. A properly structured recovery program for public pension
plans would impose funding requirements from the moment a for-
mal federal commitment is established, e.g., beginning on the date
that the enabling legislation is introduced. These requirements
would not only mandate that newly accruing pension obligations be
fully funded, as measured by federal accounting and actuarial stan-
dards, they would also require that plans take steps to reduce any
deficits at the time of the federal commitment.
Perhaps the most likely manner of federal support would be
guarantees comparable to those provided to beneficiaries of private
sector pension plans. Politically, it may be difficult to justify federal
guarantees for private plans but not for public ones. Technically, as
the director of the Congressional Budget Office has pointed out,
the “PBGC is not backed by the full faith and credit of the
U.S. government and has no authority to . . . call on general reve-
nues to pay benefits.”194 But the PBGC is federal agency, and it is
widely assumed that the federal government stands behind its
commitments.195
193. See Part III.A.4 below; see also Pension Benefits Guar. Corp., PBGC Maximum Insurance
Benefit Increases for 2014 (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press/releases/pr13-13
.html (noting that maximum guaranteed benefit for sixty-five year old retiree is $59,318.16
and that a 2006 study found that fifteen percent of retirees compensated by PBCG do not
have full amount of their benefits replaced).
194. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation: Financial Condition, Potential Risks and Policy
Options: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget 2 (2005) (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation) [hereinafter Holtz-Eakin Statement];
DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, A GUIDE TO THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION 6 (May 20,
2009), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/5/20%20pensions
%20elliott/0520_pensions_elliott.pdf.
195. See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin Statement, supra note 194; cf. Examining the Challenges Facing
PBGC and Defined Benefit Pension Plans, Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor and Pensions
of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce 5 (Feb. 2, 2012) (statement of Joshua Gotbaum,
Director, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation), http://www.pbgc.gov/news/testimony/
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Any bailout scheme requires a mechanism to distribute federal
money. The PBGC has significant experience in administering a
pension guarantee arrangement, but it has its own problems196 and
its own constituency. A new agency dedicated to supervising public
plans could, in principle, avoid some of the structural problems em-
bedded in the PBCG. When a public pension plan approaches
insolvency, the Government Pension Benefit Guaranty Agency
could terminate it, assume responsibility for paying the benefits ac-
crued to that point and obtain financial claims against the
government employer—whether a state (typically) or a local gov-
ernment. In that case, beneficiaries who have not yet retired would
become members of a successor plan that would have to be fully
funded going forward.
Without additional reforms on the federal level, it is likely that,
for reasons described in Part I.B.2, under the laws of many states,
current employees whose plans were terminated would accrue ben-
efits under the successor plan on essentially the same terms as they
enjoyed under the terminated plan. When these employees retired,
the GPBCA would pay some of their benefits and the successor plan
would pay some. A ceiling on the level of benefits guaranteed to a
beneficiary would limit federal financial exposure and place benefi-
ciaries of public plans on the same footing as those of private plans.
(The PBGC generally guarantees only up to about $59,320 of an-
nual benefits.)197 To the extent that a portion of benefits under the
terminated plan exceeds a ceiling on federal insurance, a benefici-
ary may be able to obtain additional funds through a state law claim
against the sponsoring government employer of the terminated
plans. In contrast to the mechanism used in the private pension
scheme,198 the GPBCA’s claims against the state might only extend
to guaranteed benefits; it would not necessarily pursue claims for
amounts above a federal guarantee.
As an alternative to an agency modeled on the PBGC, money
might be sent directly to jurisdictions themselves in the form of
loans or grants, or a federal guarantee of pension bonds issued by
page/tm020212.html [hereinafter Gotbaum Statement] (“Without the tools to set its finan-
cial house in order and to encourage responsible companies to keep their plans, PBGC[ ]
may face, for the first time, the need for taxpayer funds.”).
196. Gotbaum Statement, supra note 195 (“If PBGC’s finances aren’t reformed, the
agency will eventually run out of money to pay benefits.”).
197. Public Benefits Guar. Corp., supra note 193; 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3)(B) (2012). The
ceiling is indexed for inflation.
198. 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (2012) (providing that “the liability to the corporation . . . shall
be the total amount of the unfunded benefit liabilities . . . together with interest . . .”).
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government sponsors of troubled pension plans.199 Under these ap-
proaches, possibly fewer public pension plans would be terminated.
While terminating troubled government plans would be disruptive,
it does provide a straightforward means of capping the annual
amount of a beneficiary’s guaranteed benefit, thus conserving fed-
eral funds for higher priorities. Terminating failing plans also sets a
baseline to facilitate enforcing a full funding requirement for a ju-
risdiction’s employee pensions. As is currently the case for private
plans under ERISA, however, the GPBGA should have the discre-
tion whether to terminate distressed public plans.
B. Economics of Federal Regulation of Public Pension Plans
At a high level of abstraction, no economic principle dictates that
government liabilities should be fully funded.200 It has been sug-
gested that the primary rationale for requiring full funding of
private pension plans under ERISA was the threat of inadequate
resources when an insolvent business terminated a pension plan. In
those circumstances, employee beneficiaries’ claims would effec-
tively be limited to the plans’ assets at the time of termination.201
Opponents of parallel funding mandates for government pension
plans maintain that these concerns are absent in the case of public
plans. For example, according to a report of a Pennsylvania legisla-
tive commission, “Full funding may be a necessary standard for a
199. E.g., Rauh & Novy-Marx, supra 162. Rauh and Novy-Marx would close public defined
benefit plans to new employees.
200. See Stephen P. D’Arcy, James H. Dulebohn, Pyunsuk Oh, Optimal Funding of State
Employee Pension Systems, 66 J. RISK & INS. 345, 347–49 (1999), http://business.illinois.edu/~s-
darcy/papers/darcy.pdf; Henning Bohn, Should Public Retirement Plans be Fully Funded?, J. PEN-
SION ECON. & FIN. 195, 195-219 (2011) http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbs
tract?fromPage=online&aid=8255503; Dennis Epple & Katherine Shipper, Municipal Pension
Funding: A Theory and Some Evidence, 37 PUB. CHOICE 179, 179–87 (1981); Michael Peskin,
Asset/Liability Management in the Public Sector, in PENSIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 195–217
(Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead eds., Univ. of Penn. Press 2001); Richard W. Johnson,
Pension Underfunding and Liberal Retirement Benefits Among State and Local Government Workers,
50 NAT’L TAX J. 113, 113–42 (1997); Robert P. Inman, Paying for Public Pensions: Now or Later?,
FED. RESERVE BANK PHILADELPHIA BUS. REV. 3, 3–12 (Nov. 1980), http://www.phil.frb.org/
research-and-data/publications/business-review/1980/br80ndri.pdf; Edward E. Burrows, Fix-
ing the Pension Plan Funding Rules, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES (2003). Edward E. Burrows,
Fixing the Pension Plan Funding Rules, SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES 2 (2003). (“[T]he principal
objective of ERISA funding rules was the protection of workers in event of business failure.
Many observers felt this was the only legitimate objective.”).
201. JAMES A. WOOTEN, supra note 190, at 95–96, 126.
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private plan, but it is not necessary for a public plan because a pub-
lic entity can assume perpetual life.”202
As a matter of economics, both public and private institutions
could reasonably finance their pension obligations through debt,
assuming that lenders were convinced that the borrower would be
able to service it. Both public and private organizations fund capital
expenditures via debt, and many start-up ventures even fund sala-
ries and utility costs through capital markets. In the case of
technology startups, costs such as salaries can be viewed as support-
ing the production of intangible assets that are projected to
eventually support servicing the capital investments. If it is reasona-
ble for a business to borrow to purchase assets, it should also be
reasonable to borrow to produce them in-house.
For private enterprise, lenders may hesitate to support a pattern
of borrowing for true operating costs. True operating costs, by defi-
nition, generate no security for investors. Most pension obligations
are essentially operating expenses: they represent compensation for
work already performed, although they also may increase the likeli-
hood that an organization’s investments in human capital are
realized by encouraging longer tenure by employees.203 Therefore,
in general, investors would not have an incentive to fund a private
firm’s accrued pension obligations.
A government’s taxing power, however, can provide investors
with security even for funding operating expenses. At all levels of
government, a degree of deficit spending might be beneficial if it is
employed to smooth the level of taxation over time.204 On the other
hand, allowing pension plan deficits to rise until they reach unsus-
tainable levels because of legislators’ reluctance to raise present
taxes is bad economics at any level of government. The extraordi-
nary levels of taxation required when the option for additional
deficit financing is exhausted is the opposite of tax smoothing. In
other words, deficit spending can facilitate either more stable or
more erratic taxation. Furthermore, as a matter of political econ-
omy, reliance on deficit spending may lead to more liberal
202. JOINT STATE GOV’T COMM’N OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, THE FUNDING AND BENEFIT STRUCTURE OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATEWIDE RETIRE-
MENT SYSTEMS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 20 (2004), http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/
resources/documents/ftp/publications/2004-48-PENSIONS.pdf.
203. See, e.g., Richard W. Johnson, The Impact of Human Capital Investments on Pension Bene-
fits, 14 J. LABOR ECON. 520, 552–54 (1996); Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory
Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261, 1261–84 (1979); Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions
in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Literature 47 IND. LAB. REL. REV. 417 (1994); Brown, supra
note 183, at 182.
204. D’Arcy, Dulebohn & Oh, supra note 200, at 353, 363; Inman, supra note 200, at 4;
DAVID ROMER, ADVANCED MACROECONOMICS 541–45 (2d ed. 2001).
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government spending by permitting the transfer of the costs from
present to future taxpayers.205
States and local governments are not on quite the same footing
as the national government with respect to unfunded liabilities be-
cause it is easier for residents to leave a local government than the
national one in order to escape the consequences of the govern-
ment’s debts.206 Still, while the considerations are not identical for
different levels of government, there is no consensus in the eco-
nomics literature that government pension plans should be fully
funded at all times. In addition, it is often observed that, at the state
and local level, it is not prudent to approach one hundred percent
funding because it becomes more difficult politically to resist subse-
quent benefit increases, which would “in turn lead[ ] to increased
costs and long run underfunding.”207
The case for fully funding state and local plans becomes straight-
forward, however, to the extent that the federal government
provides explicit or implicit guarantees for retiree benefits. The ex-
istence of a guarantee attenuates the motivation of the pension
plan and its sponsor to prevent insolvency—the moral hazard prob-
lem endemic to insurance. When government obligations are
guaranteed, there is a presumption in favor of full funding or an
equivalent means of protecting the guarantor’s interest.208
Under this Article’s proposed regulatory framework, the assets of
a public pension plan would provide the collateral for the federal
government. So it is reasonable for the federal government to insist
that participating plans both move toward full funding and immedi-
ately fund completely new benefit obligations from the time that
the plans enter the program. In this context, the full funding re-
quirement would also relieve state and local governments from the
dilemma in which approaching one hundred percent funding trig-
gers political pressure to grant more costly benefits, and tempts
legislatures to devote the assets to other purposes or to suspend
205. See Inman, supra note 200, at 6–7; Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, Generational Accounting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, 8 J. ECON. PERSPEC-
TIVES 73 (1994), http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.8.1.73; James M.
Buchanan, The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments, 90 PUB. CHOICE 117,
117–38 (1997).
206. See Inman, supra note 200, at 6.
207. Peskin, supra note 200; see also U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH
BENEFITS, GAO-08-223 15–23 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08223.pdf.
208. See generally Zvi Bodie & Robert C. Merton, Pension Benefit Guarantees in the United
States: A Functional Analysis, in THE FUTURE OF PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (Ray Schmitt
ed., 1993); Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, On the Management of Financial Guarantees, 21 FIN.
MGMT., 87, 87–109 (1992). Cf. George L. Priest, The Government, The Market, and the Problem of
Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 219–37 (1996).
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contributions. When something approaching an eighty percent
funding ratio could be perceived as fiscally prudent, amounts in
excess of this threshold could be characterized as effectively a sur-
plus and treated as such. With a higher mandatory ratio, this
perverse incentive against achieving a more secure funding level
should be eliminated.
In itself, a full funding requirement will not adequately limit the
federal government’s exposure, even with respect to the new pen-
sion obligations of participating plans. It also will be necessary to
assess suitable risk-based premiums to discourage the program from
becoming an endless drain on the Treasury even after the built-in
losses attributable to the current predicament have been
absorbed.209
The importance of charging a premium that is based on the risk
of the plan’s investments can be illustrated by a simplified example.
Suppose that a pension plan is considering two alternative invest-
ment strategies, one of which consists of investing its funds entirely
in federal securities (Portfolio S) and another which would allocate
half of its funds to federal securities and half to stocks (Portfolio R).
Suppose the real (adjusted for inflation) expected return of Portfo-
lio S were three percent, reflecting a fifty percent chance that the
real return would be 2.5% and a fifty percent chance that the real
return would be 3.5%. Suppose that the expected return of Portfo-
lio R were five percent, reflecting a twenty-five percent chance of a
negative five percent real return, a fifty percent chance of a five
percent real return and a twenty-five percent chance of a fifteen
percent real return.210 Suppose, further, that with a real return of
less than one percent, the plan would be left with insufficient cash
flow to satisfy all of its benefit obligations; the lower the return falls
below one percent, the larger the guarantor’s required
contribution.
This example, although simplified, illustrates the problem
presented by insurance premiums that do not adequately account
for the riskiness of the insured’s portfolio. Although the second
portfolio, Portfolio R, is likely to have a higher return, it is the only
one that threatens to require indemnification by the guarantor
even if the value of the portfolio currently matches the value of
plan liabilities. So the premium for Portfolio R should account for
the guarantor’s possible payout, as well as any administrative costs.
209. See Merton & Bodie, supra note 208, at 98. Cf. Richard A. Ippolito, THE ECONOMICS
OF PENSION INSURANCE 88–91 (1989) (describing “Insurance Pricing Principles”).
210. The standard deviation of the first portfolio would be 0.5%, and of the second,
7.1%.
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From these considerations, it follows that the federal government
should set premiums to account for (1) the extent of a public
plan’s underfunding attributable to the period since it became eli-
gible for participation in the program and (2) the estimated
volatility of plan assets over the interval to which the premium ap-
plies.211 The federal government should be authorized to impose a
supplemental premium if a plan significantly increases the riskiness
of its investments after its premium is determined.
Given the existing level of underfunding of public pension plans,
premiums set high enough to shield the federal government from a
significant risk of loss as public pension-fund guarantor would cer-
tainly be very high,212 probably high enough to discourage state
participation. To the extent that states with severely underfunded
public plans fail to participate, the federal government could be
faced with the prospect of bailing out these plans anyway, without
the opportunity to encourage more sound practices for the plans.
So it is probably only feasible to protect the government from new
losses, that is, losses attributable to the period after the inception of
the federal program.
While it would be advisable to apply comprehensive federal regu-
lation to public pension plans that may require federal support,
ERISA is not an ideal model. The PBGC has never imposed a risk
premium calibrated to the default risk of a pension plan; this un-
dermines the financial stability of the PBGC, as well as the
incentives of financially stable employers to continue to offer de-
fined benefit plans.213 The premiums that the PBGC charges plans
are set by statute, and must be “uniform for all plans.”214 This and
other deficiencies in the structure of the PBGC have resulted in a
deficit of $36 billion for fiscal year 2013.215
211. Bodie & Merton, supra note 208, at 216–17.
212. Merton & Bodie, supra note 208, at 98–99.
213. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 183, at 31 (“PBGC premi-
ums are currently much lower than what a private financial institution would charge for
insuring the same risk and are insufficient for PBGC to meet its long-term obligations.”); see
generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE RISK EXPOSURE OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY COR-
PORATION 14 (Sept. 2005), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/66xx/
doc6646/09-15-pbgc.pdf.
214. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (2012).
215. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., PBGC’s Deficit Increases to $36 Billion As Multiemployer
Risks Grow: Agency Continues to Excel in Customer Service, Nov. 15, 2013, http://www.pbgc.gov/
news/press/releases/pr13-14.html; U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PENSION
BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: ASSET MANAGEMENT NEEDS BETTER STEWARDSHIP, GAO-11-
271 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/330/320643.pdf; U.S. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY OFFICE, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION: REDESIGNED PREMIUM STRUCTURE
COULD BETTER ALIGN RATES WITH RISK FROM PLAN SPONSORS, GAO-13-58 (2012), http://www
234 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:1
In the President’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2012, the
White House proposed gradually giving the PBGC the authority to
charge non-uniform premiums based on the differential risks of de-
fault posed by different pension plans. It has been estimated that
without the use of risk-based premiums, the financially sustainable
level of uniform premiums would be up to six times higher than
those actually imposed by the PBGC currently.216 If the federal gov-
ernment does not set plan premiums according to financial
economics principles, then insured public plans should  be re-
quired to fund above one hundred percent to account for the
possibility of sharp drops in the value of plan assets.217
C. Federalism
A federal role in public sector pensions is bound to be controver-
sial, not only because of the demands on the federal budget but
also because it would involve the federal government in an area
that is traditionally the States’ domain. In ordinary times, the politi-
cal obstacles alone would likely be the end of the matter. The
prospect of cascading defaults of teachers’ and public safety work-
ers’ pension plans, however, might make federal intervention
politically feasible, even compelling. In the past, constitutional con-
cerns have inhibited federal supervision of public pension plans.
The federal program proposed in this Article, however, seems to be
compatible with the principles of federalism under current consti-
tutional doctrine.
When Congress developed the comprehensive regulatory struc-
ture for pensions in the 1970s under ERISA, federalism concerns
played a role in limiting most elements of the regime to the private
sector.218 From 1975 through the mid-1980s, Congress considered a
series of bills to apply reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary rules to
public pension plans; none of these bills proposed significant regu-
lation of public plan funding levels.219 State and local officials have
consistently and vigorously opposed this sort of oversight on the
.gao.gov/assets/650/649838.pdf; PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (2012),
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2012-annual-report.pdf.
216. E.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 213, at 8. In other words, the current, uni-
form premiums charged to private pension plans are only one sixth as large as would be
necessary to maintain the long-term solvency of the PBGC insurance scheme.
217. See Bodie & Merton, supra note 208, at 212–13.
218. See, e.g., Roy v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 878 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1989).
219. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUBLIC PENSION PLANS: THE ISSUES RAISED OVER CONTROL OF
PLAN ASSETS (1990), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000016128316;
view=1up;seq=1.
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grounds that it “run[s] counter to a fundamental principle of
American federalism, namely, that the states ought to be free to
formulate their own employee compensation policies without being
restrained by federal government regulations or mandates.”220
In a 1980 report on proposals for federal regulation of public
pension plans, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re-
lations, a group composed predominantly of current or former
state and local officials, rejected any degree of federal supervision.
The Commission maintained, “There is no convincing evidence
that the federal government has any compelling ‘national interest’
in regulating state and local public pension systems.”221 In hearings
on the Public Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1982
(PERISA), a representative of the National Governors Association
testified that the organization was “absolutely opposed to this legis-
lation being applied to the State governments,” that the proposed
legislation was “an unnecessary intrusion into State affairs,” and
that it was “probably unconstitutional.”222 In the end, none of the
bills proposed in the wake of ERISA—whether styled as PERISA or
the Public Employees Pension Plan Reporting and Accountability
Act of 1984 (PEPPRA)—was enacted.223
Recently, Congress has shown renewed interest in federal over-
sight of public pension plans. The Public Employee Pension
Transparency Act (PEPTA) would impose reporting requirements
on state and local government plans, enforced by eliminating tax
preferences for state and local bonds during periods when a gov-
ernment’s plans were out of compliance.224 The bill would require a
plan sponsor to file an annual report with the Treasury describing
the characteristics of plan participants and the plan’s funding sta-
tus, sponsor contributions, actuarial assumptions, and recent
investment returns. It would mandate that the plan provide an esti-
mate of its liabilities using a low risk interest rate, based on the yield
curve on federal debt. The interest on the bonds of noncompliant
jurisdictions, normally excluded from gross income, would become
220. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL PEN-
SION SYSTEMS: FEDERAL REGULATORY ISSUES ii (1980).
221. Id. at 5.
222. Public Employee Retirement Security Act of 1982: Hearings on H.R. 4928 and H.R. 4929
before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 351 (1983), available at http://www.bookprep.com/read/mdp.39015031758
264.
223. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 219.
224. Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, S. 779, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)
(Apr. 23, 2013) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s779is/pdf/BILLS-113s779is.pdf.
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taxable.225 In its final section, the bill disclaims federal liability for
any obligations of the covered government pension plans and em-
phasizes that it would not “alter existing funding standards for State
and local government employee pension plans or . . . require Fed-
eral funding standards” for the plans.226
Imposing mandatory federal guidelines on all public pension
plans might well be incompatible with federalism principles. In
many states, public pension plans appear to be in relatively sound
financial condition.227 Across-the-board federal intervention is
neither necessary nor politically viable; on the other hand, federal-
ism is not offended when the price of federal financial support is
acceptance of federal oversight. The federal government has an in-
terest in promoting fiscal discipline and other policies that could
mitigate federal exposure to public pension plan losses.
Although the meaning of federalism is not necessarily limited to
legal formulas enforceable through litigation,228 this Article’s rec-
ommendations appear to be consistent with existing constitutional
doctrine reflected in case law. Under the Spending Clause, Con-
gress may attach conditions on the transfer of federal money to
states when those terms might be beyond the authority of Congress
to enforce if the subsidy were taken out of the equation.229 Often
the application of Spending Clause authority requires a state or lo-
cal government to conform its laws with a federal program in order
to qualify for the receipt of federal funds. For example, in South
Dakota v Dole,230 the Supreme Court held that a federal law that
withheld five percent of a state’s federal highway funds unless the
state established twenty one as the minimum drinking age was valid
under the Spending Clause “[e]ven if Congress might lack the
power to impose a national minimum drinking age directly.”231
225. Id. The general exclusion of interest on state and local bonds from gross income is
26 U.S.C. § 103(a).
226. Public Employee Pension Transparency Act, S. 779, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (Apr.
23, 2013) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s779is/pdf/BILLS-113s779is.pdf.
227. Rauh, supra note 1, at 597; Alicia H. Munnell et al., How Would GASB Proposals Affect
State and Local Pension Reporting?, 23 ST. & LOC. PENSION PLANS 1, 11–14 (2011).
228. See, e.g., Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO
BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 103
(Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr., eds., 2012)
229. The Spending Clause permits Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
230. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
231. 438 U.S. at 212; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-73 (1992);
Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2000).
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Although Congress could condition participation in a federal
program on a state’s express repeal of any conflicting state legisla-
tion, it does not appear necessary for the federal government to
confirm that a jurisdiction’s laws are entirely consistent with the
federal program before disbursing funds to the jurisdiction. Should
some aspect of a jurisdiction’s law be inconsistent with a federal
program after the jurisdiction has begun to participate in the pro-
gram, the federal rule will prevail under the Supremacy Clause.
There does not seem to be any principle preventing the federal
government from either terminating further federal funding or
seeking to recover previously spent federal money from the
jurisdiction.
In Ivanhoe Irrigation District v McCracken,232 the Supreme Court of
California had refused to enforce contracts between state agencies
and the federal government stipulating that water projects financed
in part by federal funds would not be provided to “lands in excess
of 160 acres in single ownership.”233 The California Supreme
Court’s decision was based on its determination that the contrac-
tual limitation, a prerequisite to federal funding, was incompatible
with California law.234 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court con-
firmed that the excess acreage restriction in the contracts was valid
under “the power of the Congress to condition the use of federal
funds, works and projects on compliance with reasonable require-
ments.”235 On this basis, it should be within federal power to
require or permit participating states to undertake pension reforms
that might conflict with certain state laws—even provisions of a
state constitution.236
232. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
233. Id. at 285.
234. Id. at 290 (concluding that the California Court’s decision rested on its determina-
tion that the acreage limitation would deprive the “people of the State and particularly those
in the [irrigation] district[s] involved . . . of a right to the use of the water in the district.”); see
also California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 670–71 (1978); 357 U.S. at 285.
235. 357 U.S. 275, 291. Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), the
Supreme Court decided that Congress could not authorize the President to terminate a
State’s existing level of Medicaid funding if the State elected not to participate in an expan-
sion of the program. Slip op. at 2607 (Roberts, C.J.); id. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J.) (dissenting
from this aspect of the judgment); id. at 2660–61 (joint dissent) (concurring in the judgment
on this point). This result suggests that it might be prudent to include all the key elements of
the regulatory framework in the enabling legislation, as federal sanctions for a state’s non-
compliance with subsequently imposed conditions might be restricted under principles
articulated in the opinions invaliding the Medicaid expansion.
236. The circumstances under which a State has the power (under State law) to consent
to participate in a federal program that would override certain State laws—say a provision of
the State constitution—appears to be an unsettled question. A similar question arose in De-
troit’s bankruptcy filing: did Michigan have the power (under Michigan law) to authorize a
municipal bankruptcy given that the bankruptcy court would have the ability (under federal
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The Contract Clause of the federal Constitution237 “limits the
power of the States to modify their own contracts as well as to regu-
late those between private parties.”238 This clause does not restrict
the federal government, however.239 The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment240 may impose limits on the federal government
that are analogous to the limits the Contract Clause imposes on the
States, but these restrictions would not be as substantial.241 Federal
economic legislation that substantially impairs a private contract is
presumed to be constitutional; it only violates due process if it is
arbitrary and irrational.242
In a number of states, public pension plan beneficiaries would
face the risk of receiving no benefits—or greatly diminished bene-
fits—without federal intervention. Thus, a policy permitting public
pension funds to strengthen their balance sheets and reduce their
reliance on federal money, while bringing public employees’ con-
tractual pension rights in line with private sector workers’, should
not be characterized as arbitrary or irrational.
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has been solicitous of
States’ rights under the Tenth Amendment.243 The Court has dis-
couraged federal regulation that would “commandeer” state
governments into enforcing federal mandates.244 The Court has
been more open, however, to regulation through generally applica-
ble laws that affect individuals as well as states.245
The proposals of this Article would give states considerable lati-
tude in determining the means of satisfying federal financial targets
law) to imposes cuts on public employee pension benefits that otherwise would be inconsis-
tent with the Michigan constitution. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the pension
protections of the Michigan constitution did not preclude Michigan from authorizing munic-
ipal bankruptcy. See In re Detroit, No. 13-53846, Opinion Regarding Eligibility (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. Dec. 5, 2013), available at http://www.mieb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/detroit/
docket1945.pdf.
237. “No State shall . . . pass . . . any Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts” U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10.
238. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977).
239. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732 n.9 (1984).
240. U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”).
241. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451,
472 n.25 (1985) (“We have never held that the principles embodied in the Fifth Amend-
ment’s due process guarantee are coextensive with the prohibitions against state impairment
of contracts under the Contract Clause, and . . . to the extent the standards differ, a less
searching inquiry occurs in the review of federal economic legislation.”).
242. Id. at 472, 476.
243. U.S. Const. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, or to the people.”).
244. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 933 (1997).
245. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000).
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and would not demand that states regulate in a particular fashion
or enforce federal mandates—unlike Rauh and Novy-Marx’s propo-
sal to require public (but not private) plans to phase out defined
benefit plans.246 This Article’s proposed regulation of state and lo-
cal plans would not be substantially different from the regime
applied to the private sector under ERISA.
CONCLUSION
There is a material risk that, within the next five to ten years,
public pension plan defaults will become more than isolated occur-
rences. In the past few years, state and local governments have
begun to reform their plans. However, because the benefits of ex-
isting public employees are largely insulated from modifications, it
is unlikely that these reforms can prevent many of the potential
defaults.
In the event that a government pension plan were to default on
its pension obligations to retired employees, the retirees could de-
mand compensation through state court proceedings. Whether the
retirees could actually obtain money on a timely basis is much less
clear. In many cases retirees may have great difficulty in extracting
compensation from their former government employers through
litigation, at least in the short run. Collecting a judgment against a
government in fiscal distress could prove difficult and slow since
the conventional means of enforcement, such as liens and garnish-
ment, are largely unavailable.247 For retirees, this short run may
occupy a considerable part of the pertinent time horizon.
It is foreseeable that a series of public pension plan insolvencies
will prove politically intolerable. Retired public servants would be
sympathetic casualties, and public employees would be a reliable
and politically effective constituency. Perhaps public pension plan
insolvencies will prove economically intolerable as well. The threat
of defaults by a state’s public pension plans may undermine state
government finances and that, in turn, could destabilize the market
for other states’ debt.
If there is to be a federal government intervention to prevent
public pension defaults, then sooner is better. The political appeal
of delay is clear enough: the necessary legislation will be expensive
and controversial, while the benefits are hypothetical. The policy
appeal of delay is that the prospect of federal aid will remove some
246. See Part II.C.
247. See Gentile, supra note 121, at 282.
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of the pressure on state and local governments to make sacrifices,
e.g., to raise taxes, to cut popular programs, and to test the political
and legal feasibility of reducing public employee benefits.
The cost of delay is the lost opportunity to contain the scale of
the crisis. By acting before defaults occur, the federal government
can impose fiscal discipline on underfunded pension plans that are
potential candidates for financial support, restricting the growth of
their deficits. Pressure on public pension sponsors to address ex-
isting deficits can be sustained by imposing realistic shortfall
amortization obligations on public plans in participating states.248
Delay gambles that, when defaults occur, governments will some-
how manage to find the money to satisfy their pension obligations.
If even a few jurisdictions fail this test, it will be difficult to avoid
bailing out all of them, possibly at much greater expense than if
intervention had come earlier.
248. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1083(c) (2012).
